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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
BACKGROUND 
Ireland’s public employment services (PES) have been undergoing restructuring 
since the mid-1990s. The country’s initial PES model was predominantly focused 
on passive social welfare support with no, or relatively little, consideration given 
to either activation measures or employment services to assist jobseekers to 
enter/re-enter the labour market. Consequently, the objective of the reforms that 
have been introduced has been to move PES to a model underpinned by proactive 
activation as opposed to predominantly passive income supports.  
The first set of PES reforms were implemented in 1997. Known as the National 
Employment Action Plans (NEAPs), these reforms focused on targeting certain 
groups of jobseekers and provision of employment services. Although the changes 
that were introduced were progressive, research conducted on their effectiveness 
found that the NEAP PES system was still too focused on passive income support. 
In addition, it was not successful in the delivery of efficient and effective services 
to jobseekers (e.g. Grubb et al., 2009; McGuinness et al., 2011).  
Given the issues identified with the NEAP PES model, the government further 
reformed PES in 2011. The new PES model that was introduced was initially known 
as the National Employment and Entitlement Service (NEES), but it was 
subsequently renamed Intreo in October 2012. These most recent set of reforms 
have focused on changing how services are delivered to jobseekers. However, 
there have been no substantial changes to what employment services are 
delivered (i.e. Active Labour Market Programmes (ALMPs)).  
INTREO PES MODEL 
One of the key restructurings under the Intreo reforms has been the integration of 
the provision of benefit and employment services into one-stop-shop Intreo 
centres. Prior to this restructuring, jobseekers had to interact with three separate 
departments/agencies to access benefit and employment services (the 
Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection (DEASP), Community 
Welfare Service (CWS) and FÁS).  
A new case management system that links unemployment benefit payments to 
active engagement with jobseekers to support them into employment or training 
has been introduced as well. This engagement is underpinned by the principle of 
mutual obligation, whereby jobseekers are required to engage in job search and/or 
education, training or employment programmes in exchange for receiving benefit 
payments and efficient employment services. Under the new Intreo system, 
activation commences immediately (i.e. on the day that a jobseeker makes a 
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benefit claim) as opposed to the jobseeker having to be unemployed for a certain 
period of time (three months) before being engaged with for the provision of 
employment services.  
Prior to Intreo, the monitoring of jobseekers and the imposition of sanctions for 
failure to engage with PES were components of the NEAP model. However, neither 
was fully implemented (see Grubb et al., 2009; McGuinness et al., 2011). Now 
under Intreo, if a jobseeker fails to engage with PES he/she will be sanctioned. Their 
job search activity is monitored as well through regular compulsory engagement 
with an Intreo case officer. The frequency of this engagement is determined by the 
claimant’s age and their risk of becoming long-term unemployed (i.e. their 
Probability of Exit (PEX) score – see Chapter 2): a new IT system introduced under 
Intreo uses these two pieces of information to independently determine the 
engagement pattern between the claimant and the DEASP.  
In general, the ALMP and advice offered under Intreo are similar to what was 
provided under the NEAP system. Intreo, however, operates a work-first policy – 
jobs first for those that are ready to enter/re-enter the labour market and 
education and training programmes for claimants who are not. To support this 
policy, there is now more regular engagement between the Department and local 
employers in order to encourage them to hire more individuals from the Live 
Register. 
In summary, the new Intreo PES model consists of three main phases: (i) reception 
of jobseekers (i.e. activation activities on the day that a jobseeker presents at an 
Intreo centre to make a claim), (ii) integrated decision-making (e.g. decision on 
claim, calculation of PEX score), and (iii) active case management (e.g. one-to-one 
meeting with case officer, development of personal progression plan).  
INTREO EVALUATION 
The goal in implementing the Intreo PES process reforms has been to deliver more 
streamlined, efficient, effective and targeted PES that respond to jobseekers’ 
needs. This report presents results from an initial evaluation of the effectiveness 
of the Intreo reforms in meeting this objective. Specifically, the evaluation 
identifies how the Intreo process reforms influenced various progression outcomes 
of jobseekers: (i) exits off the Live Register, (ii) exits to employment, (iii) exits to an 
education, training or an employment placement course, and (iv) exits to ‘other’ 
destinations. The evaluation is based on all new Jobseeker’s Allowance (JA) and 
Jobseeker’s Benefit (JB) recipients only. While the new approach to activation and 
engagement of jobseekers consists of three main phases, in this evaluation the 
various components of Intreo are treated as a single package of reforms. 
The evaluation compares the progression outcomes of jobseekers who entered a 
new Intreo centre in the first six months of 2011 and 2013 against similar 
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unemployment claimants who entered a standard social welfare local office 
(SWLO) that operated under the previous NEAP PES model during the same time 
periods. Based on international best practice, a difference-in-differences (DiD) 
methodology combined with propensity score matching (PSM) was the evaluation 
approach used to assess the effectiveness of the Intreo reforms. 
Under the DiD–PSM methodology, the former group of offices that introduced the 
Intreo reforms are known as the treatment group, while the SWLOs that operated 
under the old NEAP PES system are the control group. The progression outcomes 
of these two groups are examined prior to the introduction of the Intreo reforms 
(April 2011–June 2012) and after the reforms had been implemented (April 2013–
June 2014).  
MAIN FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In assessing the results from this study, it must be borne in mind that the 
evaluation was conducted at a time point early in the implementation of the new 
Intreo PES model, specifically one year after the reforms were put into operation. 
Thus, the evaluation is, at best, an assessment of the short-run effects of the Intreo 
PES reforms.  
In conducting the analysis, we found that one of the cornerstones of the new Intreo 
PES system, the Probability of Exit (PEX) profiling model, was not properly 
implemented. The function of this component of the newly designed PES model 
was to rank jobseekers into low, medium and high PEX categories for activation, 
engagement and intervention by the DEASP according to an individual’s risk of 
becoming long-term unemployed. However, when we examined the PEX 
information in the dataset that was provided by the Department for the evaluation, 
we found that 20 per cent of individuals in Intreo offices in 2013 did not have a PEX 
value.  
In addition, of the individuals that received a PEX score, each had missing data for 
some of the profiling questions used to calculate the PEX value. This means that, if 
properly implemented, these claimants’ scores were not usable for activation 
purposes and, therefore, should not have been used to segment individuals into 
different categories for engagement and intervention by the DEASP. Based on 
information provided by the Department, individuals with incomplete information 
should have been given a PEX value of zero. However, when we examined the data 
we found that this was not the case. These findings in relation to the PEX profiling 
model point to a potential process failure within the new Intreo PES system.  
In conducting the evaluation, we also found that the control group, which 
consisted of a group of SWLOs that were implementing the NEAP PES system at 
the time of the evaluation, was not a valid counterfactual to use to compare the 
outcomes of the treatment group (i.e. the offices that were operating under the 
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new Intreo PES model) against. Specifically, a key assumption of the DID evaluation 
framework is that, in the absence of the Intreo reforms, the treatment offices 
would display the same progression outcome trends as the control offices. 
However, a placebo analysis showed that this was not the case in the years prior 
to the introduction of the Intreo reforms.  
 
On further investigation, the research suggests that differences in the geographic 
locations of the treatment and control offices are the reason why each group of 
offices displayed different progression outcomes in the years prior to the 
introduction of the Intreo forms. Specifically, four of the seven treatment offices 
were located in Dublin, with a fifth located in a neighbouring county (Bray, Co. 
Wicklow), while the control offices were mainly located along the western 
seaboard: two of the control offices were located in Cork, and one in each of 
Galway, Mayo, Donegal and Tipperary. There was only one control office in Dublin.  
 
In an attempt to overcome this issue, we focused our analysis on treatment and 
control offices that were geographically close to each other. When we did this we 
found that, for the geographical sub-models that passed the placebo tests, there 
was weak evidence that the Intreo activation process reforms increased the 
probability of jobseekers exiting the Live Register at six, nine and 12 months 
following their initial claim. 
 
For the geographical sub-model consisting of the Buncrana, Letterkenny, Sligo and 
Westport offices, there was weak evidence of an employment effect at six and nine 
months. However, the Intreo reforms were found to have no effect on the 
likelihood of a claimant entering an education, training or employment placement 
course. Given that the Intreo reforms focused on how PES were to be delivered 
(i.e. the processes) as opposed to what was delivered (i.e. ALMPs), it should not be 
too surprising that we found very small employment effects from the reforms and 
no education, training or employment placement course impact.  
 
The Intreo reforms were found to increase a jobseeker’s probability of exiting to 
the ‘other’ progression outcome category. This category, which was created by the 
DEASP and consists of approximately 150 subcategories, predominantly captures 
claimants who transferred to another DEASP payment or were no longer entitled 
to JA or JB. Thus, this result, which was found in both the overall model and the 
geographical sub-models, suggests that the Intreo reforms may have led to the 
early identification of invalid unemployment claims. If so, this may indicate 
efficiency gains from having benefit and employment services delivered in a ‘one-
stop-shop’ as opposed to the PES system being fragmented, as it was under the 
NEAP model.  
Introduction | 1 
CHAPTER 1  
Introduction 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This report presents results from an initial evaluation that the Economic and Social 
Research Institute (ESRI) has undertaken of the effectiveness of the most recent 
set of activation reforms that have been made to Ireland’s public employment 
services (PES). The modifications, which are known as the Intreo activation process 
reforms, were first introduced in 2012 for all newly unemployed Jobseeker’s 
Allowance (JA) and Jobseeker’s Benefit (JB) recipients only. The reforms have 
focused on making changes to how benefit and employment services are delivered 
to jobseekers as opposed to what types of employment services are delivered (i.e., 
job search assistance, training, education courses, etc.).  
 
One of the key restructurings that has been introduced into Ireland’s PES has been 
the integration of the provision of benefit and employment services into ‘one-stop-
shop’ Intreo centres.3 Prior to this modification, jobseekers interacted with three 
separate organisations to access benefit and employment services:  
1. the Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection (DEASP),4 which 
managed the unemployment assistance payments and provided limited 
employment advisory services through its Jobs Facilitators; 
2. The Community Welfare Service (CWS) of the Health Service Executive (HSE), 
which was responsible for the provision of temporary income support and 
Supplementary Welfare Allowance (SWA) payments while the main claim was 
being processed by the DEASP; and  
3. FÁS, formerly Ireland’s national training and employment authority, which 
provided training, work placements, apprenticeships and employment 
information services (i.e. Active Labour Market Programmes (ALMPs)) to 
jobseekers.  
The introduction of the Intreo reforms, along with the other process changes that 
have been made to Ireland’s PES, have been implemented with the intention of 
delivering more streamlined, efficient, effective and targeted PES that respond to 
the needs of jobseekers.  
 
                                                          
3  Although the Department with responsibility for those who are unemployed has been renamed, as of 1 September 
2017, from the Department of Social Protection to the Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection, it is 
not proposed to make any changes to the name of Intreo offices at present.  
4  Known as the Department of Social Protection (DSP) until 1 September 2017. For further information on the new 
employment policy and labour law functions that the Department has taken on since this date, see 
https://www.welfare.ie/en/pressoffice/Pages/pr010917.aspx# 
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While labour activation reforms usually target specific services, Borghi and Van 
Berkel (2007) highlight a growing focus on operational reforms designed to 
improve administrative efficiency. As part of this process, the ‘one-stop-shop’ has 
emerged as a policy response to the problem of fragmented social security systems 
in Western Europe (Minas, 2014), as well as reflecting new ways of thinking about 
the provision of public services (Van Berkel, 2010). The United Kingdom (UK) was 
one of the first to introduce a ‘one-stop-shop’ for delivering benefit and 
employment services to its jobseekers: it did so in 2002 (Jobcentre Plus). Germany 
followed suit in 2004 (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) and France in 2009 (Pôle emploi) 
(Department of Public Expenditure and Reform, 2017). 
 
While the adoption of such policies and their potential benefits and drawbacks are 
discussed in the literature, there is a lack of evidence on the effectiveness of these 
types of process reforms, such as the implementation of ‘one-stop-shops’, on 
labour market outcomes of unemployed people. In this report, we will help to fill 
this gap in the literature by evaluating whether the PES process reforms that have 
been introduced in Ireland (i.e. the Intreo reforms) have impacted the employment 
outcomes of jobseekers. 
1.2 OUTLINE OF INTREO EVALUATION 
The primary purpose of the evaluation conducted in this report is to identify how 
effective the Intreo activation process reforms, which are discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 2, have been in improving the likelihood of jobseekers exiting 
unemployment and, in particular, in exiting to employment. This new approach to 
activation and engagement of jobseekers consists of three main phases: (i) 
reception of jobseekers, (ii) integrated decision-making, and (iii) active case 
management. In this evaluation, the various components of Intreo are treated as 
a single package of reforms.5  
Given the importance of PES in assisting the unemployed to reintegrate into the 
labour market, it is critical that any evaluation is carried out to the highest 
international standards. A difference-in-differences (DiD) methodology combined 
with propensity score matching (PSM) is the evaluation approach that is adopted 
in this study, selection of which was based on international best practice in the 
undertaking of such evaluations. The evaluation exploits variations in the roll-out 
of Intreo reforms over time in order to identify appropriate control and treatment 
offices. The PSM–DID methodology has been used in a large number of studies to 
evaluate the effectiveness of various labour activation programmes including, for 
example, job search assistance (Blundell et al., 2004; Centeno et al., 2009), general 
and specific skills training programmes (Stenberg and Westerlund, 2015), higher 
                                                          
5  Requirement set out in the Intreo evaluation Request for Tenders document. 
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caseworker-to-client ratio (Hainmueller et al., 2011) and vocational training (Reis, 
2015).  
In this evaluation, we examine the extent to which the introduction of the Intreo 
PES activation process reforms has influenced various progression outcomes for 
jobseekers: (i) exits off the Live Register, (ii) exits to employment, (iii) exits to an 
education, training or an employment placement course, and (iv) exits to ‘other’ 
destinations. The evaluation is based on all new JA and JB recipients only. This is 
because when the Intreo processes were introduced in 2012 they concentrated 
initially on all newly unemployed JA and JB recipients. In the treatment and control 
offices examined in this evaluation, existing unemployed jobseekers continued to 
receive the standard National Employment Action Plan (NEAP) PES approach (see 
Chapter 2), which they would have commenced on becoming unemployed.  
 
The evaluation compares the outcomes of claimants who entered a new Intreo 
centre (i.e. one of the social welfare local offices (SWLOs) that were among the first 
to adopt the Intreo process reforms in 20126) in the first six months of 2011 and 
2013 against similar unemployment claimants who entered a standard SWLO that 
operated under the previous NEAP PES system (i.e. offices that adopted the Intreo 
process reforms after 1 July 2014) during the same time points. Under the DiD–
PSM methodology, the former group of offices are subsequently referred to as the 
treatment group, while the latter group are referred to as the control group. The 
progression outcomes of these two groups are examined prior to the introduction 
of the Intreo PES reforms (April 2011–June 2012) and after the reforms had been 
implemented (April 2013–June 2014).  
 
One of the initial objectives of this study was to examine the impact of Intreo 
processes separately for jobseekers with different long-term unemployment risk 
levels. However, this proved not to be possible when the data received for the 
evaluation were examined. Specifically, the Live Register Probability of Exit (PEX) 
score, which ranks jobseekers into low, medium and high PEX categories for 
engagement and intervention by the DEASP according to an individual’s risk of 
becoming long-term unemployed, is based on information that is gathered from 
claimants in the second phase of Intreo. This information is then inserted into an 
econometric profiling model (see O’Connell et al., 2009), which, as part of the 
Intreo PES reforms, was rolled out in SWLOs from 2011 onwards. When we 
examined the PEX information in the dataset that was provided by the DEASP for 
this evaluation, we found that 20 per cent of individuals in Intreo offices in 2013 
did not have a PEX score.7 Furthermore, individuals that received a PEX value all 
                                                          
6  Ballymun (Dublin), Coolock (Dublin), King’s Inn Street (Dublin), Tallaght (Dublin), Bray (Wicklow), Buncrana (Donegal) 
and Sligo.  
7  Percentage based on full sample of data provided by the DEASP for the evaluation. 
 
 
4 |  An In i t ia l  Eva luat ion  of  th e E ffect iven ess o f  Intreo Act ivat ion  Reforms  
had missing data for some of the profiling questions required to calculate the PEX 
score, rendering their scores unusable for activation purposes.8 In theory, 
individuals with incomplete profiling information should have been given a value 
of zero, but in examining the data we found that this was not the case. Given that 
the introduction of the PEX profiling model was designed to be one of the 
cornerstones of the newly designed approach to activation, the apparent failure to 
properly implement the system points to a potential process failure within the 
Intreo PES system.  
 
The data provided by the Department for the evaluation were also not rich enough 
to support additional analyses of those who progressed into employment; 
specifically, in terms of examining the duration of such individuals’ next 
employment spell, the earnings associated with their new job and the specific 
occupation that the individuals entered. When we examined the data, we found 
that approximately 40 per cent of those who exited to employment had a zero 
value for their subsequent employment counts/duration. Consequently, aspects of 
job quality could not be considered as part of the evaluation. 
1.3 STRUCTURE OF REPORT 
The remainder of the report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the main 
reforms that have been made to Ireland’s PES. Chapter 3 provides a detailed 
description of the data used to evaluate the Intreo process reforms, along with the 
methodologies employed. Some descriptive statistics are presented and discussed 
in Chapter 4, while the econometric evaluation results are set out in Chapter 5. 
Finally, Chapter 6 provides a summary of the report, and also outlines the main 
conclusions that can be drawn from the evaluation. 
 
                                                          
8  Individuals providing partial information cannot be compared directly with claimants providing full information, as 
their maximum (and minimum) potential PEX values will not be identical.  
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CHAPTER 2  
Overview of reforms to Ireland’s public employment services 
Ireland’s PES have been undergoing restructuring since the mid-1990s. The 
intention of the changes that have been implemented has been to move PES to a 
model underpinned by proactive activation as opposed to predominantly passive 
social welfare supports.  
2.1 INITIAL PES MODEL  
Under the original PES model that operated in Ireland, which was in place until the 
introduction of the NEAP model in 1997, a jobseeker commenced their interaction 
with PES on the day that he/she entered their Social Welfare Local Office (SWLO; 
these offices are under the remit of the DEASP) to make a benefit claim. If the 
jobseeker had all the relevant information required to process their claim, he/she 
was fast-tracked to the Fresh Claims section. If not, then an appointment would be 
set up with the Fresh Claims section for a later date. Once claims were submitted, 
the Decisions section within the SWLO determined whether the claim would be 
awarded.  
 
If a jobseeker required financial support while their claim was being processed, 
he/she was referred to the Community Welfare Service (CWS) of the Health Service 
Executive (HSE), who provided temporary income assistance. In this situation, the 
Local Community Welfare Officer (LCWO) immediately assessed the jobseeker’s 
request and, if eligible, he/she would receive a weekly SWA payment until their 
unemployment benefit claim was decided.  
 
Jobseekers were notified by mail if their claim was awarded, and were recorded as 
being unemployed as of the date they made their original claim. Once payment of 
their appropriate jobseeker payment had commenced,9 the claimant was entitled 
to a back-payment to the date of their original benefit claim.10 
 
As can be ascertained from this description, Ireland’s original PES model was 
entirely focused on passive social welfare support, with relatively little attention 
given to employment services to support jobseekers to enter/re-enter the labour 
market.  
2.2 NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT ACTION PLANS PES MODEL  
The National Employment Action Plans (NEAPs), which covered the period 1997 to 
2011, were the first set of activation reforms that were undertaken to Ireland’s 
                                                          
9  Jobseeker’s Allowance (means-tested payment) or Jobseeker’s Benefit (based on insurance contributions). 
10  Where applicable, minus the value of the SWA payment a jobseeker got while waiting for their claim to be processed.  
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PES. The amendments that were introduced focused on targeting certain 
categories of jobseekers and provision of employment services.  
 
The NEAPs initially concentrated on those under the age of 25 that had been on 
the Live Register for six months, and were gradually extended to target all new 
entrants onto the Live Register during the 2000s. The Live Register threshold for 
intervention was reduced over time as well: from November 2006 onwards, 
individuals were pursued for employment assistance once they had been on the 
Live Register for three months.  
 
Under the NEAP PES model, the DEASP identified all individuals aged 18–65 who 
had reached three months on the Live Register and referred them for a one-to-one 
counselling interview with a FÁS Employment Services Officer (ESO). During this 
interview, the ESO provided the jobseeker with guidance and job search assistance, 
along with possible referral to a job or access to a training, education or public-
sector job creation scheme placement. After this interview, the jobseeker was 
required to adhere to the personal progression plan (PPP) drawn up with the ESO. 
However, follow-up engagement with Active Labour Market Programmes (ALMPs) 
was voluntary; thus, not all jobseekers followed their plan. For claimants who 
continued to engage with FÁS’s employment services, the ESO and the jobseeker 
agreed an interview schedule to monitor the jobseeker’s progress in the steps they 
had agreed the jobseeker would undertake to assist him/her to enter/re-enter the 
labour market. This engagement could include job search monitoring, but it was 
not formalised.  
 
Attendance at the FÁS one-to-one interview was quasi-compulsory; thus, not all 
individuals referred by the DEASP to FÁS for employment assistance attended their 
interview.11 Jobseekers who did not attend, or who subsequently declined offers 
of training or other employment service assistance, were referred back to their 
SWLO for a DEASP Deciding Officer to determine if the jobseeker continued to 
satisfy conditions for receipt of their unemployment payment.12 If the SWLO 
Deciding Officer found that the claimant had valid reasons for not availing of the 
employment services that were being offered to him/her, the jobseeker continued 
to receive their benefit payment. In these situations, the DEASP Job Facilitators 
assisted jobseekers to identify barriers to participation and explored other labour 
market entry routes for the claimant. If the jobseeker’s reasons for not attending 
the FÁS one-to-one interview were not deemed to be valid, then the jobseeker 
could be sanctioned. However, in practice this was not consistently applied.  
                                                          
11  There are various reasons why claimants may not have attended their one-to-one meeting with a FÁS ESO. For 
example, some jobseekers were able to access employment or training/education opportunities by their own efforts 
or by using the self-service facilities available in the FÁS employment service offices. Others had already found 
work/registered for a training or education course by the time that they received their referral letter. Others still may 
not have had the confidence to accept the offer of assistance, or were further away from the labour market and had 
basic literacy/numeracy difficulties or other personal issues (e.g. drug use) that prevented them from availing of the 
employment services offered to them (DSP, 2012).  
12  In Ireland, jobseeker payment recipients are statutorily obliged to be available for and genuinely seeking 
employment (DSP, 2012). 
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The reforms of the NEAP were progressive. In particular, they provided for greater 
and more systematic engagement with jobseekers through referral to a counselling 
interview with FÁS employment services. However, research conducted on the 
effectiveness of the NEAP PES model found that the system was not successful in 
delivering efficient and effective services to jobseekers, and that it was still too 
focused on passive income support as opposed to engaging more proactively with 
unemployed clients (Grubb et al., 2009; McGuinness et al., 2011). In particular, the 
lack of, or inconsistent use of, activation measures, such as requiring compulsory 
engagement with employment services, monitoring job-search activities and 
implementing a robust sanctions regime, was found to be a major flaw with the 
NEAP PES model.  
 
In addition, several barriers to efficiency were highlighted with this system. 
Specifically, the NEAP PES model was identified as being quite fragmented due to 
the number of different departments and agencies involved in delivering benefit 
and employment services to jobseekers – the DEASP, CWS and FÁS (see Figure 2.1). 
This fragmentation resulted in different rules and processes being applied to deal 
with jobseekers’ claims; control systems were fragmented; and assessment and 
control of claims were investigated separately by the DEASP and CWS, with 
different conditionality rules applied. Also, there was little data sharing across the 
organisations allowing for the effective tracking of a jobseeker through their claim 
period – from awarding of their benefit and their engagement with the various 
departments/agencies for employment services through to their exit from 
unemployment. 
 
Additionally, after having their claim processed jobseekers were not engaged with 
again for the provision of employment services until they were unemployed for a 
minimum of three months. Furthermore, the ALMPs provided focused 
predominantly on direct employment schemes (e.g. Community Employment) and 
education courses with weak labour market linkages. There was also very little, if 
any, employer involvement in determining the types of education and training 
courses to be provided to jobseekers that would assist them to enter/re-enter the 
labour market. 
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FIGURE 2.1  NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT ACTION PLAN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT SERVICES MODEL 
 
Source: DEASP. 
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model, the government established a new PES model, the National Employment 
and Entitlement Service (NEES), in 2011. The rapid rise in unemployment that the 
2008 global financial crisis, and subsequent Great Recession, gave rise to also 
contributed to the reforms that were implemented. The Programme of Financial 
Support agreement that was signed between Ireland and the EU/IMF to address 
Ireland’s national debt played a role as well. Specifically, under this agreement the 
Government agreed to reform Ireland’s PES (Department of Public Expenditure 
and Reform, 2017). This included improving activation measures, increasing 
incentives to work and strengthening sanctions for non-compliance with the job-
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search requirements for unemployment benefits (Department of Public 
Expenditure and Reform, 2017). 
 
The name of the new PES model (i.e. NEES) was subsequently changed to Intreo in 
October 2012, which was when national roll-out of the new PES system 
commenced. The reforms that have been implemented to Ireland’s PES under 
Intreo focus on how entitlement and employment services are delivered (i.e. the 
processes used) as opposed to what employment services are delivered (i.e. 
ALMP). 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, one of the main process reforms made to Ireland’s PES 
under Intreo has been the integration of the management of jobseekers’ payments 
with employment services: the delivery of unemployment benefits, supplementary 
welfare and employment and activation services by the DEASP, CWS and FÁS 
respectively are now together under one roof (see Figure 2.2). These new ‘one-
stop-shops’, known as Intreo centres, are the responsibility of one government 
department, the DEASP. The amalgamation of these three departments/agencies 
was undertaken in order to facilitate the delivery of more streamlined PES. In 
addition, it is intended that the merger of the three organisations will reduce the 
time taken to process a jobseeker’s claim and to lower the need to resort to 
temporary CWS income payments.  
 
The Intreo PES reforms have also seen the introduction of a new case management 
system that links unemployment benefit payments to active engagement with 
jobseekers to support them into employment or training. This new form of 
engagement is implemented through the principle of mutual obligation, whereby 
benefit recipients are expected to engage in job search and/or education, training 
or employment programmes in exchange for receiving benefit payments and 
efficient employment services.  
 
Under the new Intreo PES model, failure to engage with PES now results in 
jobseekers being sanctioned, which is a substantial reform of the NEAP regime: 
although sanctions and monitoring were components of the NEAP PES model, 
neither was implemented to any extent (see Grubb et al., 2009; McGuinness et al., 
2011). Authority to implement reduced rates of pay was signed into law in the 
Social Welfare (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2010, and is applied when a 
jobseeker declines any type of PES intervention offered to him/her to assist them 
to enter/re-enter the labour market.13 
 
                                                          
13  A reduced rate of payment is applied for non-attendance after a jobseeker is warned of the consequences of not 
engaging and fails to attend a second intervention.  
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In addition, under the new Intreo PES model jobseekers, specifically newly 
unemployed JA and JB claimants, are engaged with on the day that they make an 
unemployment benefit claim as opposed to having to be on the Live Register (i.e. 
unemployed) for a specified period of three months. Specifically, information is 
gathered from all new jobseekers on the day that they make their benefit claim, or 
on a day soon after,14 in order to calculate a score that identifies the jobseeker’s 
likelihood of exiting the Live Register within 12 months (see O’Connell et al., 2009). 
This score, which is known as the Probability of Exit (PEX) score, and was 
mentioned briefly in Chapter 1, is then used by the DEASP to segment jobseekers 
into three target groups (low, medium and high PEX) for determining engagement 
levels. This new tool, which is known as profiling, was introduced to improve the 
targeting of activation interventions.  
Even if a jobseeker’s PEX score is not calculated on the day that he/she makes an 
unemployment benefit claim, engagement between the DEASP and the jobseeker 
commences straight away. Specifically, on their first day in an Intreo centre 
jobseekers receive information on a Group Information Session (GIS)15 that they 
have to attend. GISs are usually scheduled three weeks after a claimant’s initial 
engagement with an Intreo officer. The GIS is a briefing session during which the 
activation process is explained to the jobseeker. If claimants do not attend the GIS, 
they are contacted to attend their nearest Intreo centre and receive a verbal 
warning if they do not have an appropriate explanation for non-attendance. If a 
claimant fails to attend a GIS for a second time, he/she is given a penalty rate. 
Approximately 30 people are invited to each GIS, which is undertaken with the 
intention of achieving a minimum of 20 attendees. On their first day, claimants are 
also given information about the support that they will receive from the DEASP, 
their role in the PES activation process and what will happen if they do not actively 
engage with the DEASP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
14  If an appointment with an Intreo officer cannot be arranged for the same day that the jobseeker makes their initial 
benefit claim, which could happen if a jobseeker does not have all the documentation required to proceed with such a 
meeting, this appointment will be organised for a date soon after the initial claim.  
15  GISs were initially trialled in October 2010. They were introduced with the intention of increasing the numbers of 
unemployed that could be engaged with in the initial period of unemployment.  
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Activation Services 
FIGURE 2.2  INTREO PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT SERVICES MODEL 
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Activation commences at the GIS. Specifically, claimants are assigned a case officer 
and are given an appointment letter for a one-to-one meeting with this person. A 
new IT system introduced under Intreo, using claimants’ PEX score information, 
independently determines the engagement pattern between the claimant and the 
DEASP:16 under the NEAP, the engagement pattern was determined by the ESO. 
Claimants with a low PEX score (i.e. low likelihood of exiting the Live Register) are 
seen monthly, as are claimants aged under 25. Medium PEX score individuals are 
engaged with every two months. After the GIS, high PEX score individuals are not 
engaged with again for six months and then these individuals are engaged with 
every two months.17 This engagement pattern is a ‘minimum’ engagement pattern 
as people can walk into an Intreo office and seek assistance at any time: claimants 
could independently walk in for employment services under the NEAP PES model 
as well.  
 
Case officers work with their claimants to develop PPPs that outline the steps that 
will be taken to move the claimants from unemployment to a job. This could 
include JSA, training, job placement, etc. PPPs were developed under the NEAP PES 
system too; however, under Intreo the PPPs specify regular compulsory follow-up 
review meetings, which have sanctions attached if not attended by the claimants. 
Thus, as indicated previously, under Intreo income support has been made 
conditional on participation in activation/case management processes.  
 
In general, the ALMP offered under Intreo, and advice, are similar to that provided 
under the NEAP PES model. Intreo, however, operates a work first policy – jobs first 
for those that are ready to enter/re-enter the labour market, and education and 
training for claimants who are not. To support this principle, there is now more 
systematic engagement with local employers to encourage hiring from the Live 
Register under the Intreo PES model, which did not operate under the NEAP 
system. Thus, as well as facilitating a single point of contact for jobseekers, Intreo 
centres facilitate a single point of contact for local employers. For the most part, 
ALMP under the NEAP PES model focused on training, education and public-sector 
job creation scheme referrals. 
 
Under the Intreo PES model, the actual number of claimants assisted, and the time 
period when they are engaged with, depends on resource availability within each 
Intreo centre: the same applied under the NEAP PES model.  
 
Under Intreo, activation and engagement end with claimants after 12 months. 
Again, this is determined centrally by the DEASP’s new IT system, and then 
implemented by the local Intreo office. At this time point, signing on the Live 
                                                          
16  Intreo centres can determine the quantity of jobseekers that are referred to the case officers within their centre. 
However, the selection of jobseekers sent to their case officers is determined independently by the new IT system that 
the DEASP introduced, which is operated centrally in Carrick-on-Shannon.  
17  Some Intreo centres run separate GIS for high PEX individuals, to account for their needs being different to low and 
medium PEX claimants. 
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Register is reinstated for low and medium PEX jobseekers and they are required to 
engage in intensive job search for six months: high PEX claimants are not required 
to attend their Intreo office for the first six months. If jobseekers continue to be 
unemployed after this time period, a Genuinely Seeking Work (GSW) meeting is 
held with their Intreo case officer for their claim to be reassessed. This GSW 
meeting is a condition for eligibility for a jobseeker’s social welfare payment. In 
more recent times, the long-term unemployed are referred to JobPath, a relatively 
new DEASP employment activation programme that is aimed at helping the long-
term unemployed, and those furthest from the labour market, back into work. This 
employment programme is operated by two private providers.18 
 
The process reforms to Ireland’s PES that were introduced under Intreo were 
developed further under the Government’s Pathways to Work (PtW) strategies. 
The first of these strategies was launched in 2012, with updates in 2013, 2015 and 
2017. The PtW strategies were designed to complement the Government’s Action 
Plan for Jobs strategies, both of which had the aim of addressing the jobs and 
unemployment crises that emerged after the Great Recession. The PtW strategies 
focus specifically on making sure that as many as possible of the new jobs that are 
being created in the economy, and any vacancies that arise, are being filled by 
unemployed jobseekers. The most recent PtW strategy, Pathways to Work 2016–
2020 (DEASP, 2017), sets out measures to extend the approach of activation from 
unemployed jobseekers only to people with disabilities and lone parents. In 
general, the PtW strategies set out a range of targets, actions and objectives to 
enhance Ireland’s PES with the intention of ensuring that the system is efficient 
and effective in helping jobseekers to transition out of unemployment and into the 
labour market.  
 
In summary, the Intreo process can be categorised into three main phases: (i) 
reception of jobseekers, (ii) integrated decision-making, and (iii) active case 
management. 
 
In phase (i), jobseekers present at an Intreo centre to make a claim. During this 
time, they register with the Employment Services (ES). They are also provided with 
a checklist for their appointment, which may take place that day if the jobseeker 
has all the required documentation, and a copy of the Record of Mutual 
Commitments (RMC). The RMC outlines the responsibilities of both the DEASP, via 
the Intreo centres, and the jobseeker. In the RMC, Intreo centres commit to finding 
suitable employment or training for the jobseeker through a PPP. The jobseeker 
commits to engage with Intreo services, attend meetings arranged by their case 
officer and take up activation programmes suggested by Intreo.  
 
                                                          
18  Seetec and Turas Nua. 
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In phase (ii), the PEX score, which measures an individual’s likelihood of becoming 
long-term unemployed, is calculated for the jobseeker and they are given 
information about the GIS. The jobseeker also signs the RMC.  
 
In phase (iii), the jobseeker will attend the GIS, during which time a one-to-one 
meeting will be arranged with a Case Officer. During this meeting, the jobseeker 
agrees a PPP and may be offered a range of activation opportunities.  
 
Progress towards the jobseeker’s PPP goals is monitored through regular 
Activation Review (AR) meetings, the frequency of which is determined by the 
jobseeker’s age and PEX score. As mentioned previously, a more stringent 
sanctions regime is in operation under Intreo, whereby failure to attend an 
appointment with their case officer results in the client being brought into the 
Intreo centre to explain, and given a warning. If the jobseeker fails to attend the 
subsequent appointment, the deciding officer may impose a reduced rate of 
payment. Continued failure to engage will result in a disqualification of the 
payment. 
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CHAPTER 3  
Data and methods 
3.1 DATA 
The DEASP provided anonymised data to the ESRI for the purpose of carrying out 
an initial evaluation of the Intreo activation process reforms. The data, which were 
extracted from the Department’s Jobseeker Longitudinal Dataset (JLD),19 contain 
information on a person’s social welfare claim history, along with their 
employment, training and activation episodes over time.  
Data were provided for 14 social welfare local offices (SWLOs) for the years 2011 
and 2013. The specific offices that were selected, along with the years, were 
necessary for the difference-in-differences (DiD) methodology that we employed 
to evaluate the Intreo PES reforms. As is discussed in more detail in Section 3.2, 
this evaluation methodology is based on identifying SWLOs that introduced Intreo 
activation process reforms in 2012, which will be referred to as the treatment 
group in this study, and offices that did not introduce the reforms and were 
therefore still operating under the NEAP PES model, which will be known as the 
control group, and comparing the Live Register exit outcomes of the two groups of 
offices at different points in time.  
With the DiD methodology, the initial comparison in the outcomes of the 
treatment and control group SWLOs is based on a year prior to the introduction of 
the Intreo reforms. Given that the reforms were introduced in 2012, 2011 was 
selected for this initial outcome examination. In 2011, none of the selected 14 
SWLOs had implemented the Intreo reforms. However, by 2013 seven of the 14 
offices (our treatment offices) had implemented the reforms while the other seven 
(our control offices) had not. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the Intreo 
process reforms, a second comparison in the Live Register outcomes of the 
treatment and control offices was undertaken in 2013, a year after the reforms had 
been implemented in the treatment offices.  
Details of the offices that form our treatment and control groups are shown in 
Table 3.1. Seven treatment offices were identified as having implemented the 
reforms in 2012. Selection of these seven offices by the DEASP as the first to 
implement the Intreo reforms was based on the physical infrastructure of the 
offices, along with the amount of work needed to convert them into ‘one-stop-
shops’ and local human resource availability. Thus, the selection process was not 
based on these offices being located in geographic areas with the highest level of 
                                                          
19  For further information on this dataset, see Kelly et al. (2015).  
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need or other such strategic criteria.  
We were restricted to the seven control offices that appear in Table 3.1 on the 
basis that the control group offices, in order to meet the underlying criteria of the 
DiD methodology, could not have implemented the Intreo reforms prior to the 
outcome period examined in 2013/2014. Specifically, we did not want spill-over of 
the treatment (i.e. Intreo reforms) into the control offices. Based on the 
information provided to us by the DEASP, the control offices listed in Table 3.1 
were the only offices that met this implementation criterion, as they did not 
implement the Intreo reforms until after 1 July 2014. 
While all DEASP staff were made aware of the roll-out of Intreo, training to 
implement the new PES system was not provided to staff in the control offices until 
the roll-out commenced in their office.20 Thus, there was no potential spill-over of 
the treatment in the control offices through this channel. In addition, the DEASP 
checked and confirmed that no claimant in the data provided for the evaluation 
had switched from a treatment to a control office. In theory, jobseekers must make 
their claim and be activated in the welfare office located within their dwelling 
catchment area, whether that was an Intreo centre or a standard SWLO during the 
time period covered by this evaluation. However, a jobseeker’s claim may be 
transferred to a new office in a different geographic location if the claimant 
changes their dwelling location. In such instances, the jobseeker is assigned to a 
case officer within the new office for continuation of their activation plan. 
Nevertheless, in order to ensure that there was no potential contamination from 
such switches in the evaluation conducted in this report, the Department removed 
any claimants who had switched office from the data provided for the study.  
Another potential concern relates to the possible contamination of the treatment 
group, i.e. we must ensure that individuals in the treatment offices who made 
claims in 2011 did not fall under Intreo regimes before 12 months of their claim 
had elapsed. The DEASP provided information that the Intreo roll-out did not occur 
in the treatment offices until the second half of 2012. Therefore, to prevent 
contamination, we restrict our analysis to individuals who started their claim in the 
first six months of 2011. As such, even observing these individuals 12 months after 
their claim (up to the end of June 2012), we can be sure that they did not benefit 
from the Intreo PES reforms.  
 
 
                                                          
20  Specifically, a dedicated, and centralised, Intreo roll-out team trained, and worked with, local staff and oversaw the 
conversion of offices to Intreo centres. Resource/training documentation was provided to staff at this time as well.  
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TABLE 3.1  SOCIAL WELFARE LOCAL OFFICES USED FOR INTREO EVALUATION 
Years in which Intreo reforms were implemented 
2012 (treatment offices) 2014 and later (control offices) 
Ballymun (Dublin) Carrigaline (Cork) 
Bray (Wicklow) Hanover Street (Cork) 
Buncrana (Donegal) Galway 
Coolock (Dublin) Letterkenny (Donegal) 
King’s Inns Street (Dublin) Nutgrove (Dublin) 
Sligo Thurles (Tipperary) 
Tallaght (Dublin) Westport (Mayo) 
 
Source: JLD. 
 
For each claimant, we have data on characteristics including gender, age, marital 
status, earnings of the spouse, nationality (Irish or non-Irish), number of 
dependent children and previous occupation, as well as on the number and 
duration of previous employment and Live Register spells (prior to the individual’s 
current claim) and pre-Intreo Public Employment Services (PES) training. In our 
econometric models (Chapter 4), we also include a local unemployment rate 
measure to control for variations in local labour market conditions between the 
treatment and control offices.  
The dataset provided to us by the DEASP for this evaluation contained information 
on 62,838 claimants in 2011 and 2013. However, as our analysis focuses on new 
entrants to Intreo offices, we focused only on individuals with no Live Register 
history, of which there were 18,189 cases. In addition, there were 487 cases who, 
although not recorded as having a Live Register history, were listed as having a 
previous episode in the past month involving either some type of labour market 
intervention or DEASP payment. Of these claimants, 158 (32 per cent), were 
recorded as having had an episode with FÁS. One Parent Family Payments and 
Specific Skills Training accounted for a further 26 per cent and 16 per cent of these 
cases respectively. The remaining individuals came from a wide variety of episodes 
including, for example, Community Employment (CE) schemes, Back to Education 
Allowance (BTEA), Back to Work Scheme (BTWS) and JobBridge. We excluded these 
487 cases with an intervention in the previous 30 days, and were therefore left 
with a sample of 17,702 new Jobseeker’s Allowance (JA) and Jobseeker’s Benefit 
(JB) claimants. This sample represents our baseline specification. However, we also 
conducted sensitivity tests to check whether our results are robust to alternative 
specifications, one of which involved estimating our models using the full sample 
of 62,838 claimants. When we did this we found that our results remained 
consistent across various specifications.  
With regard to the subsequent outcomes of claimants, we have data on whether 
they were in employment, on the Live Register or in education or training at 
intervals of three, six, nine and 12 months following their claim. We also have data 
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on individuals who exited the Live Register for ‘other’ reasons, such as being 
transferred to another DEASP scheme or no longer being entitled to JA or JB.  
Of the 17,702 individuals in our sample, 8,414 (48 per cent) are claimants from a 
treatment office and 9,288 (52 per cent) are from control offices. Tables 3.2 and 
Table 3.3 show the distribution of claimants across offices for the years 2011 and 
2013. In the treatment offices, the Tallaght and King’s Inns offices combined 
account for approximately half of the observations. The distribution was relatively 
stable over the two periods. 
 
TABLE 3.2  GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF CLAIMANTS ACROSS TREATMENT OFFICES 
Office 2011 2013 
Ballymun 5.81% 
n = 260 
6.61% 
n = 260 
Bray 15.07% 
n = 675 
15.57% 
n = 613 
Buncrana 5.20% 
n = 233 
5.23% 
n = 206 
Coolock  13.24% 
n = 593 
13.69% 
n = 539 
King’s Inn Street 21.42% 
n = 959 
21.24% 
n = 836 
Sligo 9.96% 
n = 446 
9.93% 
n = 391 
Tallaght 29.30% 
n = 1,312 
27.72% 
n = 1,091 
 
Source: JLD. 
 
With regard to the control offices, the Hanover Street (Cork) and Galway offices 
combined account for almost 65 per cent of observations. Again, the distribution 
remained relatively stable across the two time periods. 
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TABLE 3.3  GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF CLAIMANTS ACROSS CONTROL OFFICES 
Office 2011 2013 
Carrigaline 5.15% 
n = 274 
5.04% 
n = 200 
Cork – Hanover Street 37.80% 
n = 2,011 
36.32% 
n = 1,441 
Galway 25.28% 
n = 1,345 
24.87% 
n = 987 
Letterkenny 7.88% 
n = 419 
8.39% 
n = 333 
Nutgrove 15.17% 
n = 807 
17.16% 
n = 681 
Thurles 5.86% 
n = 312 
5.67% 
n = 225 
Westport 2.86% 
n = 152 
2.55% 
n = 101 
 
Source: JLD. 
 
While the JLD is a very rich data source, these data were due to be augmented for 
the Intreo evaluation with additional personal characteristic information that the 
Department gathers on all new social welfare claimants through its profiling 
system, which, as indicated previously, was rolled out in SWLOs from 2011. This 
system, which produces the PEX score that the DEASP uses to segment jobseekers 
into categories for activation engagement (low, medium and high PEX groups), was 
discussed in detail in Chapter 2.21 The answers to the 30 PEX questions that provide 
data for the profiling model relate to a claimant’s educational attainment, labour 
market history, unemployment benefit history, literacy and numeracy difficulties, 
health, access to public transport, etc. The data also contain the actual PEX score 
that is derived for each claimant.  
While the PEX information presents a potentially rich source of data, it was not 
possible, for a number of reasons, to fully utilise these data in our analysis. The 
main issue, as mentioned in Chapter 1, related to the limited coverage of PEX data. 
While 90 per cent of individuals in treatment offices in 2013 had a PEX value, the 
corresponding figure for control offices was 75 per cent.22 In 2011, just 38 per cent 
of individuals in treatment offices and 30 per cent of individuals in control offices 
had a PEX value. This latter finding is due to the fact that roll-out of PEX was not 
fully implemented in 2011, and its subsequent implementation was mainly 
concentrated, as one would expect, in Intreo offices. Nonetheless, it appears that 
10 per cent of individuals in the treatment offices who should have had PEX scores 
did not.  
                                                          
21  For further information on the Department’s use of the PEX model, see: 
http://www.welfare.ie/en/downloads/pathwaystowork.pdf 
22  These statistics relate to our restricted sample of 17,702 new claimants. 
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In examining the PEX data, we also found an issue relating to the completeness of 
data for the PEX questions. An individual’s PEX score should be calculated based 
on their response to 30 PEX questions. We were provided with data from the 
Department that contained 30 variables that correspond to the 30 PEX questions. 
However, no individual with a PEX score had complete data on all 30 questions. This 
suggests that individuals had varying minimum and maximum possible PEX scores 
depending on the questions answered and, as such, the scores could not be directly 
compared with each other. The extent of the missing data is shown in Table 3.4, 
which shows the frequency of the number of incomplete questions. For example, 
49 per cent of those with a PEX value have missing data relating to eight of the PEX 
questions. 
The identification of these PEX data issues is a concern given that, since 2012, the 
PEX model, as discussed in Chapter 1, has been a key component in the 
Department’s toolkit for segmenting jobseekers into different groups (low, 
medium and high PEX) for activation engagement and intervention: it was also a 
cornerstone in the Pathways to Work (PtW) strategy that the Department devised 
to address the unemployment crisis that arose after the Great Recession in 2008.  
 
TABLE 3.4  INCOMPLETE PEX DATA 
Incomplete PEX questions (out of 30) % 
22 0.01 
21 0.01 
17 0.01 
15 0.01 
12 0.01 
11 0.03 
10 3.11 
9 20.76 
8 48.74 
7 21.06 
6 3.12 
5 0.27 
4 0.51 
3 1.49 
2 0.79 
1 0.09 
Total 100 
 
Source: JLD  
 
One of the PEX questions captures a person’s highest educational attainment, 
which is an important control variable in analysis of labour market outcomes. 
However, for the reasons stated above, this piece of information could not be used 
in this evaluation study. In an attempt to overcome this issue, the Department 
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provided another source of education data, which were collected separately to the 
PEX questions.23 However, analysis of these other data revealed some issues that 
made them unusable. While the coverage of this other education data source was 
greater than the PEX data, there were still a large number of claimants with missing 
information. In 2013, no education data were available for approximately 40 per 
cent of individuals in both the treatment and control groups. The corresponding 
figures for missing data in the treatment and control groups in 2011 were 30 per 
cent and 36 per cent respectively.  
A more serious issue than the limited data coverage was the systematic differences 
that were found to exist between the individuals for whom education data were 
provided and those for whom no education data existed. Table 3.5 compares the 
duration of the unemployment event (in calendar days) for individuals in the two 
groups, using the combined 2011 and 2013 data.24 The average duration of a 
claimant’s unemployment event is substantially higher for the group with 
education data than for the group with no education data (360 days compared to 
197 days). As such, it appears that the group with education data face significantly 
greater labour market disadvantage compared to the group without education 
data. In fact, information provided by the DEASP on the collection of this education 
data supports this. Specifically, these education data were gathered by the case 
officers who only engaged with jobseekers when they had been unemployed for 
more than three months. Given this, individuals with no education data would have 
had higher exit rates from unemployment to employment. Thus, they would not 
be as disadvantaged, in terms of ability to access the labour market, as the group 
with education data who were unemployed for a minimum of three months.  
 
TABLE 3.5  DURATION OF EVENT (CALENDAR DAYS) 
Education data available Mean (days) Min (days) Max (days) Observations 
No 197 1 1889 6,351 
Yes 360 1 1916 11,351 
Total 302 1 1916 17,702 
 
Source: JLD. 
 
This disadvantage is reinforced when we examine the outcomes of the groups (i.e. 
those with and without education data). In Table 3.6 we show the outcomes of 
both groups six months after the date of their initial unemployment claim. While a 
similar pattern is observed for three, nine and 12 months, for brevity we just show 
the six-month outcomes. It is clear that the group for which education data exist 
have much less favourable outcomes than the group without education data. For 
                                                          
23  These other education data came from the Department’s Client Services System (CSS). 
24  An event relates to a claim of either JA or JB. 
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example, just 20 per cent of the group with education data are in employment six 
months after the start of their claim, compared to 49 per cent of the other group. 
 
TABLE 3.6  OUTCOMES SIX MONTHS AFTER START OF CLAIM 
 Education Data No Education Data 
 Freq. % Freq. % 
Closed off Live Register for other reasons 456 4.02 511 8.05 
In education, training or employment placement courses 826 7.28 222 3.50 
In employment 2,270 20.00 3,121 49.14 
On Live Register 7,799 68.71 2,497 39.32 
 
Source: JLD. 
 
In the absence of usable educational attainment information, we use a variable 
that captures a person’s previous occupation (prior to their current claim). This will 
act as a proxy for educational attainment as the person’s previous occupation and 
their education levels will be correlated. For example, those classified as managers 
and professionals will likely be educated to tertiary level. 
3.2 METHODS 
In this analysis, the impact of the introduction of the Intreo process reforms is 
estimated using a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach. We use cross-sectional 
data from 2011 and 2013. In each year, we observe two groups of individuals – 
jobseekers from Intreo offices (the treatment group) and jobseekers from non-
Intreo offices (the control group). To examine the effect of the reforms on the 
likelihood of claimants exiting the Live Register to employment, for example, the 
DiD estimator involves measuring the change in employment probabilities before 
and after the introduction of the Intreo process reforms, i.e. in 2011 (pre) and 2013 
(post), in both the treatment and control groups. 
The DiD estimate of the Intreo employment effect is then obtained by subtracting 
the difference in the outcomes in the treatment group from the difference in the 
outcomes in the control group. If we observed a large increase in employment 
probabilities in the treatment group, while at the same time observing no change 
in the employment probabilities in the control group, then we would get a positive 
DiD employment estimate which would indicate that the reforms increased a 
person’s likelihood of finding a job. However, if we observed an increase in the 
treatment group’s employment probabilities and a similar increase for the control 
group’s, this would indicate that the Intreo reforms had no employment effect. 
More formally, the DiD estimator can be described as follows. We identify two 
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groups within the population of jobseekers: those that were claimants in the Intreo 
SWLOs25 (i.e. the treatment group) and those that were not (i.e. the control group). 
We then identify two time periods: one before and one after the introduction of 
the Intreo processes; in this case, as mentioned in Section 2.1, 2011 and 2013 
respectively. When we are examining the impact of Intreo reforms on the 
probability to exit the Live Register to employment, for example, we can define the 
DiD estimator by letting: 
 q0,T = the percentage of jobseekers in the treatment offices that exited to 
employment in 2011 (i.e. pre-Intreo); 
 q1,T = the percentage of jobseekers in the treatment offices that exited to 
employment in 2013 (i.e. after the introduction of Intreo); 
 q0,C = the percentage of jobseekers in the control offices that exited to 
employment in 2011 (i.e. pre-Intreo); 
 q1,C = the percentage of jobseekers in the control offices that exited to 
employment in 2013 (i.e. after the introduction of Intreo). 
 
Using the DiD methodology, we compare the difference between the change in 
rates of exit to employment in each group before and after the introduction of the 
Intreo reforms. For the treatment group, the total difference in exit to employment 
rates before and after the introduction of the Intreo approach is q1,T − q0,T. For the 
non-Intreo control group, the total difference is q1,C − q0,C. The DiD equation is 
therefore expressed as: 
DiD = (q1,T − q0,T) – (q1,C − q0,C)        (1) 
 
By making some reasonable assumptions, we should be able to predict the sign of 
this equation. If the introduction of the Intreo reforms increased the probability of 
claimants exiting from the Live Register to employment, then (q1,T − q0,T) will be 
positive. The introduction of Intreo should have no impact on the outcomes of the 
control groups, so that, all else being equal, (q1,C − q0,C) should be zero. Crucially, 
there should be no factor other than Intreo that affects the probability of exit of 
one group more than it affects the other. Therefore, if the Intreo process reforms 
increased the probability of exit to employment, the DiD coefficient will be 
positive. Each of the other outcomes that we examine the effect of the Intreo 
reforms on (i.e. exiting the Live Register, exiting to an education, training or 
employment placement course, or exiting to ‘other’) is undertaken using this same 
methodology. 
The model to be estimated, which is applied to pooled (2011 and 2013) data, can 
                                                          
25  Here, Intreo offices refer to the offices that implemented Intreo in 2012 (see Table 3.1). 
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be written as follows: 
itiiiiiii XGTGTY 
 43210 ˆ)*(ˆˆˆˆ      (2) 
where 𝑌௜  is the progression outcome being examined (e.g. exit to employment) for 
person ‘i’; 𝛼ො଴௜ is the intercept term; 𝛽መଵcaptures the time effect from moving from 
the pre-Intreo year to the post-Intreo year; 𝛽መଶ captures the group effect in the pre-
Intreo year (i.e. any differences between the treatment and control groups in 
2011); 𝛽መଷ is the DiD estimate, which captures the effect of the Intreo reforms on 
the outcome variable (e.g. exit to employment); 𝛽መସ captures the impact of control 
variables used in the model; and 𝜀௜̂௧  is the error term. 
While technically rather straightforward, the DiD approach is extremely powerful 
as it eliminates any biases relating to time-invariant unobserved influences (i.e. 
unobserved heterogeneity). In terms of estimation, the DiD model is estimated 
using standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. 
The DiD methodology provides an unbiased estimate of the impact of Intreo 
reforms if the trend over time would have been the same between the treatment 
and control groups in the absence of the intervention; this is what is known as the 
common trend assumption. For example, we should observe that the trend in 
outcomes between the two groups in previous years (prior to Intreo) was the same. 
If we then observe a deviation in this common trend after the introduction of 
Intreo, we can infer that this was due to the Intreo reforms. 
This assumption can be tested using identical information about the treatment and 
control groups over a period where no intervention took place, also known as a 
placebo time period. In order to test that this common trend assumption holds for 
this evaluation of the Intreo reforms, the DEASP provided us with the required data 
for 2009. With these data, we were able to rerun the DiD model using information 
from 2009 as the placebo control period, and we used the 2011 information as the 
placebo treatment period. If common trends exist, the DiD coefficient in the 
placebo time period equation (i.e. 2009), 𝛽መଷ
௣௟, should be equal to zero. If 𝛽መଷ
௣௟ is  
statistically different from zero, this may indicate that the DiD framework is 
unsuitable to isolate the impact of Intreo. 
A potential source of bias in a DiD model occurs when (i) treatment and control 
group composition changes over time – for example, the proportion of individuals 
in the treatment offices with third-level education falls over the two time periods 
being examined and that of individuals with low levels of education increases; or 
(ii) treatment and control groups differ on characteristics that are related to the 
trend over time. Propensity score matching (PSM) methods are commonly used to 
minimise this type of selection bias. Propensity scores, as proposed by Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983), are used to place a higher weight on the control group 
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observations that have a similar set of observable characteristics to those in the 
treatment group, thereby comparing the outcomes of the treated with the 
outcomes of ‘similar’ individuals in the control group. 
PSM methods are commonly used with a single treatment group and a single 
control group, whereby the propensity weights are applied to the control group to 
match their characteristics to those of the treatment group. In the DID framework, 
however, we have four different groups of interest: treatment group pre-Intreo 
(group 1), treatment group post-Intreo (group 2), control group pre-Intreo (group 
3) and control group post-Intreo (group 4). 
Stuart et al. (2014) proposed a methodology that applies the PSM strategy in the 
DiD framework. The strategy they suggested removes biases due to differences in 
covariate distributions between the four groups. In this setting, the propensity 
score is defined as the probability of being in the treatment group in the control 
period, versus the probability of being in each of the other three groups. To 
estimate the propensity scores, a multinomial logistic regression predicts the 
likelihood of being in each group as a function of a set of observed covariates Xi. 
For each individual i, a propensity score ek(Xi), is estimated indicating the 
probability of being in group k, for k = 1–4. These four probabilities sum to one for 
each individual. A set of propensity score weights is then created so that each 
group is weighted to be similar to the treatment group in the control period as 
follows: 
𝑤௜ =  𝑒ଵ(𝑋௜)/𝑒௚(𝑋௜) 
where g refers to the group in which individual i is observed. Individuals in the 
treatment group in the control period receive a weight of 1, while individuals in 
other groups receive a weight that captures the probability of being in group 1 
relative to the probability of being in the group in which they were observed. Using 
these weights when estimating the DiD equation allows us to obtain a consistent 
estimate of the treatment effect of interest, even in the presence of selection on 
observed covariates across the four groups.26 We refer to this methodology as the 
PSM–DiD method. 
                                                          
26  As is shown in the following chapters, the covariate distribution is quite similar between the groups even in the absence 
of propensity weighting. The results of the analysis are therefore robust to a standard DiD approach without the PSM 
component.  
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CHAPTER 4  
Descriptive statistics 
In this chapter we present descriptive statistics relating to a number of personal 
and unemployment characteristics for the treatment and control groups in both 
the control and treatment time periods, 2011 and 2013 respectively. As mentioned 
in Chapter 3, the treatment group consists of individuals from SWLOs that 
implemented the Intreo activation process reforms in 2012, whereas the control 
group are from offices that did not implement the Intreo PES reforms during the 
time period covered by the study.27 The control and treatment time periods are 
2011 and 2013 and are denoted T0 and T1 respectively. 
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics relating to the average characteristics of 
individuals in the treatment and control groups in both the control (2011) and 
treatment (2013) time periods.28 With regard to gender, 50–55 per cent of the 
sample in both treatment and control groups were males. The majority of 
individuals were single and a relatively high percentage were previously employed 
in elementary, clerical, sales or skilled trade occupations. 
Taken as a whole, the data indicate that there were no large systematic differences 
between the control and treatment groups over the two time periods, indicating 
that problems related to potential selection bias are unlikely to impact our 
econometric estimates (Chapter 5). While most occupations are generally stable 
over time, there is a notable increase in elementary workers in the treatment 
group, from 15.7 per cent in 2011 to 24.2 per cent in 2013. Elementary workers in 
the control group, however, remained relatively unchanged over the two time 
periods (15.0 per cent in 2011 compared to 16.2 per cent in 2013). There was a 4 
percentage point reduction in skilled trade workers between 2011 and 2013, in 
both treatment and control groups. 
 
 
 
                                                          
27  The Intreo reforms were not introduced in the control offices until at least 2014. As discussed in Chapter 3, 2014 was 
a minimum time period requirement in the selection of the control offices in order to avoid potential spill-over effects, 
i.e. individuals in the control offices receiving Intreo process reforms during the period of the study, thus potentially 
contaminating the evaluation results. Consequently, the Department ensured that the offices that were selected for 
the control group met this minimum Intreo introduction time period requirement.  
28  Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix show the p-values for the differences between the treatment and control groups in 
each time period, as well as differences within the treatment and control groups across time. 
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TABLE 4.1  PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
 Treatment group Control group 
 
T = 0 
(2011) 
T = 1 
(2013) 
T = 0 
(2011) 
T = 1 
(2013) 
Male 53.8% 50.0% 55.0% 49.5% 
Age (years) 32.4 32.6 32.1 33.3 
Irish national 78.2% 76.3% 80.0% 80.0% 
Average number of dependent children (including no 
children) 
0.25 0.28 0.25 0.27 
Marital status     
Married 30.8% 29.9% 33.7% 31.8% 
Cohabiting 6.1% 4.6% 5.4% 5.0% 
Separated 4.4% 5.2% 4.0% 4.6% 
Single 57.1% 58.9% 55.7% 57.5% 
Widow 1.1% 0.5% 1.0% 0.6% 
Unknown 0.5% 0.9% 0.3% 0.5% 
Occupation     
Managers 7.0% 9.4% 7.4% 9.7% 
Professionals 8.2% 7.6% 11.5% 12.5% 
Associate professionals 5.2% 5.5% 5.1% 5.4% 
Clerical 13.9% 11.0% 9.7% 9.0% 
Skilled trades 15.0% 10.7% 14.0% 10.1% 
Other services 12.2% 11.0% 10.6% 12.1% 
Sales 13.1% 11.5% 16.6% 14.4% 
Operatives 9.8% 9.1% 10.0% 10.7% 
Elementary 15.7% 24.2% 15.0% 16.2% 
Observations n = 4478 n = 3936 n = 5320 n = 3968 
 
Source: JLD. 
 
Table 4.2 gives information on the earnings of the claimants’ spouses. This category 
is not applicable for the majority of individuals: this is consistent with the 
descriptive statistics from Table 4.1, which show that approximately 60 per cent of 
individuals are single. Of the applicable categories, most have a spouse with zero 
earnings (approximately 14 per cent in the treatment and control groups).  
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TABLE 4.2  EARNINGS OF SPOUSE 
 Treatment group Control group 
 T = 0 (2011) T = 1 (2013) T = 0 (2011) T = 1 (2013) 
Nil 14.0% 12.9% 14.0% 13.2% 
Not applicable 67.1% 67.0% 66.0% 64.6% 
<€100 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 
€100–€310 1.0% 0.6% 0.8% 0.8% 
€310–€400 1.6% 1.5% 1.9% 1.5% 
€400+ 10.3% 10.5% 10.7% 13.6% 
Details unknown 6.0% 7.4% 6.5% 6.2% 
Observations n = 4478 n = 3936 n = 5320 n = 3968 
 
Source: JLD. 
 
Table 4.3 provides information on claimants’ employment history prior to 
becoming unemployed. Again, the data indicate that there were no large 
systematic differences between the control and treatment groups over the two 
time periods (2011 and 2013).  
TABLE 4.3  CLAIMANTS’ EMPLOYMENT HISTORY PRIOR TO BECOMING UNEMPLOYED 
 Treatment group Control group 
 
T = 0 
(2011) 
T = 1 
(2013) 
T = 0 
(2011) 
T = 1 
(2013) 
Number of employment episodes prior to becoming 
unemployed 
1.8 1.7 2.1 2.0 
Duration of employment episodes (days) prior to 
becoming unemployed 
1941 1950 2056 2219 
Observations n = 4478 n = 3936 n = 5320 n = 3968 
 
Source: JLD  
 
Table 4.4 provides descriptive statistics on the percentage of treatment and control 
group claimants in employment at three, six, nine and 12 months after their first 
claim. In both the treatment and control groups, there is a slight increase in the 
percentage in employment in 2013 compared to 2011. The magnitude of the 
increase is similar in both groups and therefore there is no clear descriptive 
evidence of a significant effect of the Intreo activation process reforms on the 
probability of claimants exiting the Live Register to employment.  
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TABLE 4.4  PERCENTAGES IN EMPLOYMENT: 3, 6, 9 AND 12 MONTHS AFTER FIRST CLAIM 
 Treatment group Control group 
 T = 0 (2011) T = 1 (2013) T = 0 (2011) T = 1 (2013) 
In employment 3 months after event 14.6% 18.7% 18.6% 21.0% 
In employment 6 months after event 26.4% 30.0% 31.6% 33.9% 
In employment 9 months after event 31.4% 35.1% 37.2% 39.7% 
In employment 12 months after 
event 
34.3% 37.3% 39.9% 42.9% 
Observations n = 4478 n = 3936 n = 5320 n = 3968 
 
Source: JLD.  
 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 provide descriptive statistics relating to the other outcome 
categories: the percentages exiting to education or training, and the percentages 
exiting the Live Register for ‘other’ reasons. Approximately 1.5 to 2 per cent of 
claimants go into education or training at the three-month interval, increasing to 
between 5 and 8 per cent in subsequent periods following the start of their claim. 
Individuals closing off the Live Register for ‘other’ reasons, such as being 
transferred to another DEASP scheme or no longer being entitled to JB, account for 
approximately 2 per cent of claimants after three months, with this figure 
increasing to between 10 and 13 per cent after 12 months. 
 
TABLE 4.5  PERCENTAGES IN EDUCATION OR TRAINING: 3, 6, 9 AND 12 MONTHS AFTER FIRST 
CLAIM 
 Treatment Group Control Group 
 T = 0 (2011) T = 1 (2013) T = 0 (2011) T = 1 (2013) 
Education/training 3 months after 
event 
1.6% 2.3% 1.5% 2.0% 
Education/training 6 months after 
event 
5.3% 6.8% 5.4% 6.5% 
Education/training 9 months after 
event 
7.1% 8.9% 7.5% 9.3% 
Education/training 12 months after 
event 
6.7% 7.6% 6.8% 8.0% 
Observations n = 4478 n = 3936 n = 5320 n = 3968 
 
Source: JLD. 
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TABLE 4.6  PERCENTAGES IN OTHER OUTCOMES: 3, 6, 9 AND 12 MONTHS AFTER FIRST CLAIM 
 Treatment Group Control Group 
 T = 0 (2011) T = 1 (2013) T = 0 (2011) T = 1 (2013) 
Other reasons 3 months after event 1.6% 2.8% 1.8% 1.5% 
Other reasons 6 months after event 5.4% 6.5% 5.3% 4.7% 
Other reasons 9 months after event 7.8% 9.6% 7.2% 7.8% 
Other reasons 12 months after event 11.0% 13.3% 10.0% 11.0% 
Observations n = 4478 n = 3936 n = 5320 n = 3968 
 
Source: JLD  
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CHAPTER 5  
Econometric results 
In this chapter, we present and discuss the results of the econometric analysis of 
the effectiveness of the Intreo activation process reforms to Ireland’s PES. We 
begin by examining the impact of the Intreo reforms on the probability of a 
jobseeker having exited the Live Register. We then examine the impact of the new 
Intreo PES model on the probability of a claimant being: (i) in employment, (ii) in 
education or training or on an employment placement course, and (iii) in an ‘other’ 
Live Register exit category. 
In each case, we examine the probability of being in the relevant outcome category 
at three months, six months, nine months and 12 months after the first interaction 
with an Intreo centre. All results are estimated using the PSM-DiD framework, 
where the weights are estimated using the methods described in Chapter 3.29  
5.1 CLOSED OFF THE LIVE REGISTER 
Table 5.1 presents PSM–DiD estimates of the impact of the Intreo activation 
process reforms on the probability of a claimant having exited the Live Register 
three months, six months, nine months and 12 months after their first interaction 
with the new Intreo PES model. In each case, the coefficients show the impact of a 
marginal increase in the variable of interest on the probability of having exited the 
Live Register at each of the time points considered.30 Note that a person may exit 
the Live Register for various reasons: finding a job, going into education or for other 
reasons. In this section, we begin by looking at whether a person has exited the 
Live Register and in the sections that follow this we examine the specific type of 
Live Register exits (employment, etc.).  
The coefficients associated with our independent variables reveal that those with 
an earning spouse, married individuals and those who were recently in higher 
skilled occupations are more likely to have exited the Live Register. In addition, the 
greater the number of employment episodes that an individual had prior to 
becoming unemployed, the more likely they will be to have left the Live Register. 
However, as the number of dependent children increases, the probability of exiting 
the Live Register decreases. In addition, being Irish, relative to all other 
                                                          
29  Propensity scores are estimated based on the following variables: sex, age, spousal income, number of dependent 
children, jobseekers claim in past 30 days, nationality (Irish), marital status, claim type, occupation, number of previous 
employment episodes, previous employment duration, and a dummy variable indicating receipt of pre-Intreo training 
(BTEA, FÁS, etc.). Appendix Table A3 compares the unweighted and weighted summary statistics. 
30  For categorical explanatory variables (e.g. male), the coefficient shows the probability of exiting the Live Register 
relative to the omitted category (in the example given, female).  
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nationalities, is associated with a lower probability of exiting the Live Register. We 
also include a dummy variable to indicate whether the individual received pre-
Intreo training, which primarily relates to pre-Intreo Community Employment (CE) 
schemes or FAS events. Given that our sample conditions on individuals with no 
Live Register history, we would not expect to observe many of these cases. 
However, it should be noted that for programmes such as the CE scheme, 
individuals could qualify without being in receipt of JA or JB.31 Approximately 7 per 
cent of the sample have pre-Intreo training. According to the results in Table 5.1, 
having pre-Intreo training reduces a person’s probability of exiting the Live Register 
by between 2 and 7 percentage points.32 
The coefficient of primary interest is the DiD coefficient (Ti*Gi), which shows the 
impact of the introduction of the Intreo activation process reforms on the 
probability of having exited the Live Register at each of the time points examined. 
The results suggest that the Intreo reforms had a small but statistically significant 
positive impact on the probability of having exited the Live Register at three 
months, six months and nine months after the individual’s first interaction with an 
Intreo centre. After three months, individuals in Intreo offices were 3.4 percentage 
points more likely to have exited the Live Register than those in the control offices, 
controlling for a range of confounding variables. After six and nine months the 
effect was 4.0 percentage points and 3.1 percentage points respectively. After 12 
months, however, there was no statistically significant difference in the probability 
of having exited the Live Register between individuals in Intreo offices and 
individuals in the control SWLOs that operated under the NEAP PES model. 
Nevertheless, the activation reforms introduced to Ireland’s PES under Intreo do 
appear to be effective in reducing the incidence of short-run durations on the Live 
Register. From a budget perspective, this reduction in durations is likely to have an 
impact on the Exchequer costs of payments to jobseekers.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31  For example, individuals can qualify through the One-Parent Family scheme. 
32  We cannot rule out administrative errors in the data whereby some of these individuals actually were previously on 
the Live Register but were not classified as such. However, we observe the same results even if we exclude the pre-
Intreo training individuals from our sample (results available from the authors on request). 
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TABLE 5.1  PSM–DID RESULTS FOR PROBABILITY OF EXITING THE LIVE REGISTER  
 3 months 
6 
months 
9 
months 
12 
months 
Treatment group (Gi) −0.032*** −0.029*** −0.035*** −0.036*** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
2013 (Ti) 0.031*** 0.035*** 0.060*** 0.055*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
DiD (Ti*Gi) 0.034*** 0.040*** 0.031** 0.021 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
Male 0.005 0.009 0.010 −0.005 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Age at start of event 0.008*** 0.005** 0.006*** 0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age squared −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** −0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Spousal earnings (€ p.w., relative to zero 
spousal earnings)     
Not applicable 0.035*** 0.049*** 0.040** 0.063*** 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
<€100.00 0.030 0.365*** 0.304*** 0.323*** 
 (0.089) (0.107) (0.108) (0.107) 
€100–310.00 0.107*** 0.219*** 0.220*** 0.235*** 
 (0.031) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
€310.01–€400.00 0.074*** 0.083*** 0.132*** 0.144*** 
 (0.025) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
≥€401.00 0.046*** 0.043*** 0.059*** 0.133*** 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Details unknown −0.039*** −0.072*** −0.105*** −0.066*** 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
No. child dependants −0.018*** −0.026*** −0.029*** −0.032*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Irish (relative to all other nationalities) −0.022*** −0.029*** −0.048*** −0.059*** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Marital status (relative to married)     
Cohabiting −0.015 −0.058*** −0.053*** −0.068*** 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Separated −0.054*** −0.099*** −0.104*** −0.125*** 
 (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Single −0.035*** −0.024* −0.007 −0.020 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Widow −0.046 −0.065* 0.006 −0.004 
 (0.030) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Unknown 0.033 −0.024 −0.036 −0.041 
 (0.042) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) 
JB claim category (relative to JA) −0.185*** −0.019 0.075*** 0.107*** 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) 
Occupation (relative to elementary)     
Manager 0.062*** 0.098*** 0.088*** 0.123*** 
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 3 months 
6 
months 
9 
months 
12 
months 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Professional 0.107*** 0.159*** 0.162*** 0.173*** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
Associate professional  0.067*** 0.113*** 0.108*** 0.123*** 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Clerical 0.076*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.108*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
Skilled trades 0.045*** 0.029** 0.021 0.035** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Other services 0.028** 0.051*** 0.043*** 0.040*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Sales 0.028** 0.060*** 0.069*** 0.079*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Operatives 0.040*** 0.045*** 0.034** 0.055*** 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Number of pre-event employment events 0.023*** 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Total duration of pre-event employment events 
(calendar days) 0.000* −0.000 0.000** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pre-Intreo training −0.021* −0.057*** −0.075*** −0.046*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Unemployment rate −0.003 0.001 0.002 −0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 0.095* 0.271*** 0.345*** 0.436*** 
 (0.049) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
Observations 17,499 17,321 17,263 17,233 
R-squared 0.050 0.071 0.089 0.091 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, a key assumption of the DiD framework is that common 
trends exist between treatment and control groups. One way to see this would be 
to plot the outcome variables for the treatment and control groups over time; 
specifically, prior to the introduction of the Intreo activation process reforms in 
2012. 
To test this common trends assumption, the DEASP provided us with 2009 data, in 
addition to the 2011 and 2013 data. Using these data, we tested the assumption 
of common trends by estimating our PSM–DiD model on a placebo time period in 
which no Intreo activation process reforms were implemented, namely 2009 and 
2011. The presence of a statistically significant DiD coefficient in the placebo model 
would call into question the common trends assumption and therefore the 
reliability of the results obtained for the non-placebo years.  
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In Table 5.2, we show the results from our placebo test. The top row of the table 
shows the DiD coefficients from a PSM–DID analysis run over the placebo time 
period (2009–2011). All control variables are included in all regression models, 
though all are not shown for brevity.33 In each case, the DiD coefficient is 
statistically significantly different from zero, indicating that common trends do not 
exist between treatment and control groups, at least for the period 2009–2011. 
This calls into question the reliability of the DiD coefficients from the main analysis 
for 2011-2013. However, the DiD coefficient for the placebo years is negative, 
which indicates that over the period 2009 to 2011 the rate of exits from the Live 
Register was higher in the control offices. If this relationship was constant over 
time, and would have also been present in the absence of any treatment in the 
2011 to 2013 period, this would imply that the model could be exerting a 
downward bias that is resulting in a possible underestimation of the Intreo 
activation process reform impacts.34  
The presence of statistically significant pre-treatment effects for the placebo years 
is an indication that the control offices are not a valid counterfactual for the 
treatment offices. The key assumption for a valid counterfactual in the DiD analysis 
is that in the absence of the Intreo PES reforms the treatment offices would have 
displayed the same outcome trends as the control offices. However, the placebo 
analysis showed this was not the case in the preceding years. The reason for this 
may be some systematic difference between the treatment and control offices.  
One clear difference between treatment and control offices relates to their 
geographical location. Four of the seven treatment offices are located in Dublin, 
and one is close to Dublin (Bray, Co. Wicklow). The control offices are primarily 
located along the western seaboard: there are two control offices in Cork and one 
each in Galway, Mayo, Donegal and Tipperary. There is just one control office in 
Dublin. In our econometric set-up, we included local unemployment rates to try to 
control for regional variation in labour markets throughout the country. However, 
it is likely that other geographic differences exist that are not fully captured by the 
local unemployment rate. Such differences could potentially invalidate the 
assumption that the control offices represent a valid counterfactual for the 
treatment offices. 
In order to try to address this issue, we estimate two separate models using group 
treatment and control offices which are located in similar geographical locations. 
In the first model, our treatment offices are in Donegal (Buncrana) and Sligo and 
the control offices are in Donegal (Letterkenny) and Mayo (Westport). The second 
model uses two Dublin offices as the treatment and control offices (Tallaght and 
Nutgrove). It should be noted that while this approach may reduce observable 
differences between the control and treatment offices, the estimates are highly 
                                                          
33  Available from the authors on request. 
34  In such instances, even a zero coefficient could be indicative of a positive treatment effect of the Intreo PES reforms. 
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location-specific and, as such, may not necessarily reflect the impact of the Intreo 
activation process reforms nationally. 
The lower panels of Table 5.2 use the same PSM–DiD framework to evaluate the 
impact of the Intreo PES reforms using only the aforementioned treatment and 
control offices. In the Nutgrove–Tallaght model, there is evidence of a 10 
percentage point increase in the probability of exiting the Live Register between 
nine and 12 months following the individual’s initial claim. A negative, statistically 
significant result is found in the placebo year for this model at the nine-month 
interval. There is no statistically significant effect for the Buncrana–Letterkenny–
Sligo–Westport model. The results of the geographical sub-models provide some 
indication that the Intreo reforms resulted in some acceleration of exits from the 
Live Register, at least in the Dublin region. 
In the following sections, we examine the various outcome categories in more 
detail (e.g. exits to employment) in order to examine the extent to which any 
increase in the probability of exiting the Live Register is a result of Intreo activation 
process reforms.  
TABLE 5.2  DID COEFFICIENTS FROM PSM–DID ANALYSIS OF PROBABILITY OF EXITING THE LIVE 
REGISTER  
 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 
All offices     
Placebo (2009–2011) −0.041*** −0.033*** −0.036*** −0.026** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
 n = 31,667 n = 31,363 n = 31,255 n = 31,193 
Main (2011–2013) 0.034*** 0.040*** 0.031** 0.021 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
 n = 17,499 n = 17,321 n = 17,263 n = 17,233 
Buncrana, Letterkenny, Sligo, Westport     
Placebo (2009–2011) 0.021 0.004 0.058** 0.026 
 (0.022) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) 
 n = 4,255 n = 4,206 n = 4,176 n = 4,165 
Main (2011–2013) 0.030 0.034 −0.019 −0.010 
 (0.032) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041) 
 n = 2,239 n = 2,213 n = 2,196 n = 2,196 
Nutgrove, Tallaght     
Placebo (2009–2011) 0.025 −0.029 −0.076*** −0.037 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
 n = 6,485 n = 6,443 n = 6,423 n = 6,414 
Main (2011–2013) −0.034 0.016 0.107*** 0.093*** 
 (0.025) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) 
 n = 3,858 n = 3,818 n = 3,814 n = 3,800 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
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5.2 DETAILED OUTCOME CATEGORIES 
Table 5.3 examines the change in the probability of exiting the Live Register to 
employment at each time point (three, six, nine and 12 months) as a result of being 
exposed to Intreo activation process reforms. The results for the baseline model, 
which includes all treatment and control offices, indicate that Intreo had a positive 
and statistically significant effect on an individual’s probability of finding 
employment three months after the start of their claim. The magnitude of the 
effect is in the order of 2 percentage points. However, as before, the baseline 
model does not pass the placebo test, which calls into question the validity of the 
common trends assumption. Nonetheless, as was the case in Table 5.2, the placebo 
coefficients are negative and this implies that the model could be exerting a 
downward bias that is resulting in a possible underestimation of the Intreo PES 
reform impacts. 
If it could be established that the negative placebo effect was part of a trend of 
lower exit rates in the treatment offices prior to the introduction of the Intreo 
process reforms, then a movement from a negative to a neutral impact in 2013 
could be interpreted as a positive treatment effect. However, there were 
insufficient data to validate the existence of differential trends between the 
treatment and control office exit rates prior to 2011. 
There is some evidence of an employment effect at six months when we focus on 
the Buncrana, Letterkenny, Sligo and Westport offices, whereby individuals from 
Intreo offices were 7 percentage points more likely to be in employment. In the 
Nutgrove–Tallaght model, there is evidence of a positive employment effect of 
approximately 5 percentage points after 12 months. However, the results show a 
negative and significant employment effect after three months. While the 
Nutgrove–Tallaght model passes the placebo test, with no statistically significant 
results in the placebo years, the Buncrana–Letterkenny–Sligo–Westport model 
shows a positive and statistically significant employment result after three months, 
albeit the strength of the effect is very small. 
In summary, while there is some weak evidence of a positive employment effect 
as a result of Intreo, particularly at the three- and six-month periods, the results do 
not establish a conclusive employment effect due to the presence of some 
significant placebo coefficients and the negative three-month coefficient for 
Nutgrove and Tallaght. Nonetheless, given the relatively short time period that has 
elapsed since the implementation of the Intreo activation process reforms in the 
treatment offices, the finding of any positive impacts on transitions to employment 
is promising, particularly considering that the Intreo reforms focused on 
streamlining the activation process as opposed to altering the form of 
interventions provided to jobseekers (i.e. no extensive changes in the ALMP 
provided under the Intreo PES from what was provided under the NEAP PES 
model). 
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TABLE 5.3 PSM–DID ANALYSIS OF PROBABILITY OF BEING IN EMPLOYMENT  
 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 
All offices     
Placebo (2009–2011) −0.029*** −0.030*** −0.039*** −0.025** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
 n = 31,667 n = 31,363 n = 31,255 n = 31,193 
Main (2011–2013) 0.019* 0.018 0.015 0.004 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
 n = 17,499 n = 17,321 n = 17,263 n = 17,233 
Buncrana, Letterkenny, Sligo, Westport     
Placebo (2009–2011) 0.033* −0.023 −0.011 −0.004 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) 
 n = 4,255 n = 4,206 n = 4,176 n = 4,165 
Main (2011–2013) 0.012 0.070** 0.050 0.028 
 (0.027) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) 
 n = 2,239 n = 2,213 n = 2,196 n = 2,196 
Nutgrove, Tallaght     
Placebo (2009–2011) 0.026 0.015 −0.007 −0.005 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) 
 n = 6,485 n = 6,443 n = 6,423 n = 6,414 
Main (2011–2013) −0.041* −0.029 0.045 0.054* 
 (0.023) (0.028) (0.029) (0.030) 
 n = 3,858 n = 3,818 n = 3,814 n = 3,800 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates 
 
Table 5.4 examines the impact of Intreo PES process reforms on the probability of 
being in education or training or on an employment placement course for each 
time point. There is no evidence of any effect due to the Intreo reforms for the 
baseline model. Likewise, for the geographical sub-models, there is no conclusive 
evidence. While the results show a positive and significant effect for the Nutgrove–
Tallaght model at nine months, there is a negative effect of roughly the same 
magnitude for the Buncrana–Letterkenny–Sligo–Westport model. Furthermore, as 
with the other outcome categories shown above, the models show some 
significant results for the placebo years.  
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TABLE 5.4  PSM–DID ANALYSIS OF PROBABILITY OF BEING IN EDUCATION, TRAINING OR 
EMPLOYMENT PLACEMENT COURSE  
 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 
All offices     
Placebo (2009–2011) −0.002 0.001 0.002 −0.000 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
 n = 31,667 n = 31,363 n = 31,255 n = 31,193 
Main (2011–2013) −0.001 0.003 −0.000 −0.006 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
 n = 17,499 n = 17,321 n = 17,263 n = 17,233 
Buncrana, Letterkenny, Sligo, Westport     
Placebo (2009–2011) 0.001 0.038*** 0.040** 0.023 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) 
 n = 4,255 n = 4,206 n = 4,176 n = 4,165 
Main (2011–2013) 0.000 −0.048* −0.041 −0.037 
 (0.014) (0.025) (0.028) (0.026) 
 n = 2,239 n = 2,213 n = 2,196 n = 2,196 
Nutgrove, Tallaght     
Placebo (2009–2011) 0.003 −0.018** −0.017 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) 
 n = 6,485 n = 6,443 n = 6,423 n = 6,414 
Main (2011–2013) −0.010 0.014 0.042** 0.012 
 (0.008) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015) 
 n = 3,858 n = 3,818 n = 3,814 n = 3,800 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
All individuals who are closed off the Liver Register at the time point of interest, 
but are not in employment, education or training or on an employment placement 
course, are categorised as being in the ‘other’ outcome category, a category that 
was devised by the Department in the data that it provided us with for this 
evaluation.  
Table 5.5 shows there was a small but statistically significant increase in the 
probability of being in the ‘other’ category as a result of the Intreo activation 
process reforms across all time points. In the baseline model, which uses all offices, 
individuals exposed to the Intreo PES model are approximately 2 percentage points 
more likely to be in the ‘other’ outcome category than individuals in the control 
offices. The only significant result for the placebo years is a small, negative 
coefficient at the three-month period. While the Buncrana–Letterkenny–Sligo–
Westport model shows no significant results, the Nutgrove–Tallaght model 
indicates, similarly to the baseline model, that individuals exposed to Intreo were 
2–3 percentage points more likely to be in the ‘other’ category after three and six 
months. 
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TABLE 5.5  PSM–DID ANALYSIS OF PROBABILITY OF BEING IN THE ‘OTHER’ OUTCOME CATEGORY  
 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 
All offices     
Placebo (2009–2011) −0.010*** −0.004 0.000 −0.001 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
 n = 31,667 n = 31,363 n = 31,255 n = 31,193 
Main (2011–2013) 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.016** 0.024** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
 n = 17,499 n = 17,321 n = 17,263 n = 17,233 
Buncrana, Letterkenny, Sligo, Westport     
Placebo (2009–2011) −0.013 −0.010 0.028* 0.007 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) 
 n = 4,255 n = 4,206 n = 4,176 n = 4,165 
Main (2011–2013) 0.017 0.011 −0.029 −0.002 
 (0.013) (0.020) (0.023) (0.027) 
 n = 2,239 n = 2,213 n = 2,196 n = 2,196 
Nutgrove, Tallaght     
Placebo (2009–2011) −0.004 −0.026** −0.051*** −0.038*** 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) 
 n = 6,485 n = 6,443 n = 6,423 n = 6,414 
Main (2011–2013) 0.017** 0.031** 0.019 0.027 
 (0.008) (0.014) (0.018) (0.020) 
 n = 3,858 n = 3,818 n = 3,814 n = 3,800 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
 
This gives rise to the question of what specific states are contained in the ‘other’ 
category. To address this question, additional information was requested from the 
Department on the subcategories that it used to derive the ‘other’ outcome 
category. Based on the data received from the DEASP, there are over 150 
subcategories in the ‘other’ category. These subcategories can be collapsed into 
three broader subcategories: (i) no longer entitled to unemployment, (ii) no reason 
stated/other, and iii) transferred to another Department scheme. 
In Table 5.6, we show the distribution of individuals in the ‘other’ outcome 
category across these three headings. In calculating the distribution shown in Table 
5.6, we combine all of the ‘other’ outcomes in the four time periods: three, six, 
nine and 12 months.  
Approximately 34 per cent of the ‘other’ category is made up of individuals who 
are transferred to another DEASP scheme. We have no further information on 
approximately 32 per cent of this group, while 34 per cent are classified as being 
no longer entitled to unemployment. The results suggest that the procedural 
changes that accompanied the introduction of the Intreo activation process 
reforms resulted in the more effective early identification of individuals who were 
not entitled to, or were unsuitable for, unemployment assistance. As the Intreo 
reforms were principally process reforms, the results indicate important impacts 
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in this area, i.e. in the efficient delivery of PES to jobseekers. 
TABLE 5.6  DISTRIBUTION OF OUTCOMES WITHIN THE ‘OTHER’ OUTCOME CATEGORY 
Outcome % 
No longer entitled to unemployment benefit 34.4 
No reason stated/other 32.0 
Transferred to other DEASP scheme 33.6 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
Given the finding from the DiD analysis for the ‘other’ outcome category, attention 
should be given to how the Intreo activation process reforms are interacting with 
the assignment of such outcome codes. However, it should be noted that 
compared to the other outcome categories (exits to employment, etc.), the 
number of ‘other’ cases is relatively small.35 
We can also use the PSM–DiD framework to examine whether Intreo had any 
impact on the number of episodes we observe for an individual. Given that the 
underlying dataset used in the evaluation contains records from the first six 
months of the year, it is important to note that it is the number of episodes in the 
first six months of the year that we examine in Table 5.7.  
Intreo had no effect on the number of episodes an individual was likely to have in 
the first six months of the year for both the baseline and geographically restricted 
models. In the baseline model, the placebo years show a small negative effect. This 
indicates that there was a greater increase in the number of episodes for 
individuals in control offices over the period 2009–2011 compared to those in 
treatment offices. 
As stated previously, if this is a long-run trend, then the zero coefficient in our main 
model could potentially be interpreted as a positive effect. For example, it is 
possible that in the absence of the Intreo PES reforms, the trend observed in the 
2009–2011 period could have continued into the 2011–2013 period, in which case 
we would have observed a statistically significant, positive coefficient. Therefore, 
it is possible that the absence of any effect in the treatment period actually reflects 
a positive effect which is offsetting the negative trend. However, as before, we do 
not have a sufficiently long time series to observe whether this was a long-run 
trend.  
 
                                                          
35  For example, in 2013, just 5 per cent of individuals were classified in the ‘other’ outcome category six months following 
their claim. This compares to 12 per cent in education or training, 32 per cent in employment and 51 per cent on the 
Live Register. 
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TABLE 5.7  PSM–DID ANALYSIS OF NUMBER OF EPISODES 
 First 6 months of the year 
All offices  
Placebo (2009–2011) −0.012*** 
 (0.004) 
 n = 30,985 
Main (2011–2013) 0.003 
 (0.004) 
 n = 17,097 
Buncrana, Letterkenny, Sligo, Westport  
Placebo (2009–2011) −0.007 
 (0.010) 
 n = 4,128 
Main (2011–2013) 0.008 
 (0.011) 
 n = 2,174 
Nutgrove, Tallaght  
Placebo (2009–2011) −0.005 
 (0.008) 
 n = 6,379 
Main (2011–2013) −0.007 
 (0.009) 
 n = 3,777 
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
As an additional robustness check, we also report results from two additional specifications. 
The first excludes individuals with a Live Register history of greater than 50 days in duration 
and the second includes all individuals in the sample. The results are reported in appendix 
tables A4 to A11. These results are consistent with those presented above, namely that the 
Intreo reforms increased a claimant’s probability of exiting the Live Register for ‘other’ 
reasons and increased the probability of going into employment three months following the 
start of the claim. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusion 
6.1 THE EVALUATION 
The initial evaluation of the Intreo activation process reforms to Ireland’s PES that 
is conducted in this report was undertaken using anonymised data provided by the 
DEASP from its Jobseeker Longitudinal Dataset (JLD). A difference-in-differences 
(DiD) methodology combined with propensity score matching (PSM) was used to 
conduct the evaluation. 
6.2 FINDINGS 
The main findings from this initial evaluation of the Intreo activation process 
reforms can be summarised as follows. 
1. Based on the assignment of offices, it appears that the control group of offices 
are not a valid counterfactual to use in the DiD analysis. Significant effects were 
found in placebo years, which should not occur if the common trends 
assumption that underlies the DiD methodology was fulfilled; thus, this outcome 
(i.e. that the common trends assumption is not met when the full sample of 
offices are used to evaluate the Intreo reforms) should be taken into 
consideration when interpreting the evaluation results presented in this report. 
2. We attempted to overcome this issue by focusing on treatment and control 
offices that were geographically close to each other. When we narrow the 
sample to offices which are geographically close and that pass the placebo tests, 
there is weak evidence that Intreo activation process reforms have increased 
the probability of jobseekers exiting the Live Register at six, nine and 12 months 
following an individual’s initial claim. 
3. There is weak evidence of an employment effect at six and nine months when 
we focus on the geographical sub-model of Buncrana, Letterkenny, Sligo and 
Westport offices, where individuals from Intreo offices were approximately 5 
percentage points more likely to be in employment after six and nine months 
relative to individuals in the control offices. 
4. The Intreo activation process reforms were found to have no impact on the 
probability of a jobseeker entering an education, training or employment 
placement course. 
5. The Intreo reforms were also found to increase a claimant’s probability of exiting 
to the ‘other’ category by approximately 2 percentage points. This result was 
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found in the baseline model as well as the geographical sub-models. Thus, the 
overall result showing Intreo activation process reforms increasing a jobseeker’s 
likelihood of exiting the Live Register appears to be predominantly driven by the 
‘other’ exits. 
6. No impact was found for the number of episodes that a claimant had in the first 
six months of the year. 
6.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
It must be borne in mind that this evaluation was conducted at a time point early 
in the implementation of the new Intreo PES model; specifically, one year after the 
activation process reforms were introduced. Thus, at best, the evaluation can only 
establish the very short-run impacts of these reforms. The Intreo system was 
introduced to provide a more streamlined service to jobseekers in a one-stop-shop 
environment; this was a substantial departure from the previous NEAP PES system, 
under which employment services were split across a number of separate 
departments and agencies. 
The Intreo PES system differs from the NEAP PES model in a number of other 
important respects, including: (1) the activation process began immediately and 
was underpinned by a principle of mutual obligation; (2) a profiling system was 
introduced to allow for different activation intensities depending on claimants’ 
needs; and (3) more conditionality was applied to claims, with clearer guidelines 
for the imposition of penalties for non-compliance. Nevertheless, it is also 
important to stress that key elements of the activation process would have 
remained common to both the NEAP and Intreo PES systems; in particular, 
claimants’ access to job search assistance and training opportunities would have 
remained relative similar across the two PES models. Given this, the introduction 
of the Intreo activation process reforms should be considered as a logical 
streamlining of benefit receipt and activation services rather than a fundamental 
overhaul of all the key components of PES functions, i.e. claim activation, job 
search assistance, monitoring, training provision and sanctions. Hence, the impacts 
of the introduction of the Intreo reforms on exits to employment are unlikely to be 
substantial and that initial effects are more likely to be observed in process and 
efficiency gains. The results of our evaluation generally confirm this to be the case.  
In particular, the evaluation found that the introduction of Intreo had some 
marginal impacts on exits from the Live Register, with some more substantial 
impacts detected when the Live Register exit data were analysed at a more 
geographically disaggregated level. While the introduction of reforms had small 
positive impacts, at best, in terms of exits to employment and no discernible 
impact regarding exits to training, more substantial gains were observed regarding 
exits to ‘other’ outcomes. The ‘other’ category principally relates to individuals 
being identified as not qualifying or suitable for jobseeker payment assistance. 
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Therefore, the results suggest that the reforms have led to the early identification 
of invalid unemployment claims, providing evidence of clear efficiency gains of 
having services delivered under a single point of contact. While this, and the finding 
that the reforms appear to have been effective in reducing the incidence of short-
run durations on the Live Register, are likely to give rise to savings to the 
Department, and ultimately the Exchequer, estimation of such savings is outside 
the scope of this study. 
Some data and methodological issues need to be taken into account when 
interpreting the results. For the time period examined in this evaluation, we cannot 
rule out the possibility of pre-existing diverging trends between the outcomes of 
individuals in the treatment and control offices. This potentially invalidates the 
common trend assumption required for the DiD methodology. As mentioned 
above, we attempted to address this issue in our evaluation by selecting control 
and treatment offices that were in close geographical proximity to each other, and 
the approach proved to be successful in satisfying the common trends assumption 
that underlies the DiD methodology. It should also be noted that, where the data 
suggest, in the period preceding the recession exit rates were typically higher in 
the control offices, and if this occurred as part of a trend it is possible that the data 
may be downwardly biasing our programme estimates. However, we do not have 
sufficient data to validate or reject this possibility. 
Finally, our analysis highlighted some issues with the roll-out of the profiling model. 
In particular, we found that 20 per cent of individuals in Intreo offices in 2013 did 
not have a PEX score. Also, for individuals for whom a PEX score was calculated, 
many had missing data for some of the questions required to calculate their PEX 
score. In theory, such claimants should have been given a zero PEX value, but this 
appears not to have been the case for all of them. Given that the PEX model is a 
key component of the Intreo PES model, and has been used by the Department to 
segment jobseekers into different categories (low, medium and high PEX) for 
engagement and intervention since 2012, further investigation is required as to 
how this tool has been implemented to date: in particular, to determine whether 
the model is being utilised to achieve the objectives that the system was initially 
designed and implemented to fulfil. 
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APPENDIX  
TABLE A1  DIFFERENCES IN PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS AMONG TREATMENT AND CONTROL 
GROUPS 
 Treatment 
Group 
(2011) 
Control 
Group 
(2011) 
P-Value 
(Difference) 
Treatment 
Group 
(2013) 
Control 
Group 
(2013) 
P-Value 
(Difference) 
Male 53.8% 55.0% 0.220 50.0% 49.5% 0.671 
Age (years) 32.4 32.1 0.309 32.6 33.3 0.023 
Irish national 78.2% 80.0% 0.038 76.3% 80.0% 0.000 
Average number 
of dependent 
children  
0.25 0.25 0.900 0.28 0.27 0.404 
Number of pre-
event employment 
events 
1.8 2.1 0.000 1.7 2.0 0.000 
Duration of pre-
event employment 
events (days) 
1941 2056 0.005 1950 2219 0.000 
Marital status       
Married 30.8% 33.7% 0.002 29.9% 31.8% 0.071 
Cohabiting 6.1% 5.4% 0.116 4.6% 5.0% 0.418 
Separated 4.4% 4.0% 0.285 5.2% 4.6% 0.166 
Single 57.1% 55.7% 0.150 58.9% 57.5% 0.230 
Widow 1.1% 1.0% 0.692 0.5% 0.6% 0.297 
Unknown 0.5% 0.3% 0.044 0.9% 0.5% 0.018 
Occupation       
Managers 7.0% 7.4% 0.453 9.4% 9.7% 0.648 
Professionals 8.2% 11.5% 0.000 7.6% 12.5% 0.000 
Associate 
professionals 
5.2% 5.1% 
0.846 
5.5% 5.4% 
0.776 
Clerical 13.9% 9.7% 0.000 11.0% 9.0% 0.004 
Skilled trades 15.0% 14.0% 0.162 10.7% 10.1% 0.350 
Other services 12.2% 10.6% 0.013 11.0% 12.1% 0.146 
Sales 13.1% 16.6% 0.000 11.5% 14.4% 0.000 
Operatives 9.8% 10.0% 0.668 9.1% 10.7% 0.022 
Elementary 15.7% 15.0% 0.352 24.2% 16.2% 0.000 
Earnings of spouse       
Nil 14.0% 14.0% 0.926 12.9% 13.2% 0.693 
Not applicable 67.1% 66.0% 0.240 67.0% 64.6% 0.027 
<€100 0.1% 0.1% 0.785 0.1% 0.2% 0.210 
€100–€310 1.0% 0.8% 0.416 0.6% 0.8% 0.359 
€310–€400 1.6% 1.9% 0.268 1.5% 1.5% 0.818 
€400+ 10.3% 10.7% 0.481 10.5% 13.6% 0.000 
Details Unknown 6.0% 6.5% 0.309 7.4% 6.2% 0.025 
Observations n = 4478 n = 5320  n = 3936 n = 3968  
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TABLE A2  DIFFERENCES IN PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS WITHIN TREATMENT AND CONTROL 
GROUPS OVER TIME 
 
Treatment 
Group 
(2011) 
Treatment 
Group 
(2013) 
P-Value 
(Difference) 
Control 
Group 
(2011) 
Control 
Group 
(2013) 
P-Value 
(Difference) 
Male 53.8% 50.0% 0.001 55.0% 49.5% 0.000 
Age (years) 32.4 32.6 0.411 32.1 33.3 0.000 
Irish national 78.2% 76.3% 0.033 80.0% 80.0% 0.974 
Average number 
of dependent 
children  
0.25 0.28 0.049 0.25 0.27 0.287 
Number of pre-
event employment 
events 
1.8 1.7 0.001 2.1 2.0 0.216 
Duration of pre-
event employment 
events (days) 
1941 1950 0.847 2056 2219 0.001 
Marital status       
Married 30.8% 29.9% 0.399 33.7% 31.8% 0.051 
Cohabiting 6.1% 4.6% 0.003 5.4% 5.0% 0.497 
Separated 4.4% 5.2% 0.074 4.0% 4.6% 0.158 
Single 57.1% 58.9% 0.106 55.7% 57.5% 0.074 
Widow 1.1% 0.5% 0.001 1.0% 0.6% 0.037 
Unknown 0.5% 0.9% 0.038 0.3% 0.5% 0.121 
Occupation       
Managers 7.0% 9.4% 0.000 7.4% 9.7% 0.000 
Professionals 8.2% 7.6% 0.307 11.5% 12.5% 0.141 
Associate 
professionals 
5.2% 5.5% 
0.499 
5.1% 5.4% 
0.557 
Clerical 13.9% 11.0% 0.000 9.7% 9.0% 0.261 
Skilled trades 15.0% 10.7% 0.000 14.0% 10.1% 0.000 
Other services 12.2% 11.0% 0.090 10.6% 12.1% 0.029 
Sales 13.1% 11.5% 0.020 16.6% 14.4% 0.003 
Operatives 9.8% 9.1% 0.339 10.0% 10.7% 0.296 
Elementary 15.7% 24.2% 0.000 15.0% 16.2% 0.127 
Observations n = 4478 n = 3936  n = 5320 n = 3968  
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TABLE A3  WEIGHTED AND UNWEIGHTED DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 Unmatched Matched 
 
Treated 
in 2011 
Treated 
in 2013 
Control 
in 2011 
Control 
in 2013 
Treated 
in 2011 
Treated 
in 2013 
Control 
in 2011 
Control 
in 2013 
Male 53.8% 50.0% 55.0% 49.5% 53.8% 54.2% 53.7% 53.5% 
Age (years) 32.4 32.6 32.1 33.3 32.4 32.4 32.5 32.4 
         
Marital status         
Married 30.7% 29.9% 33.7% 31.8% 30.8% 30.7% 30.7% 30.7% 
Cohabits  6.1% 4.7% 5.4% 5.0% 6.1% 5.9% 6.3% 6.2% 
Separated 4.4% 5.2% 4.0% 4.6% 4.4% 4.5% 4.5% 4.4% 
Single 57.1% 58.9% 55.7% 57.5% 57.1% 57.3% 56.8% 57.2% 
Widow 1.1% 0.5% 1.0% 0.6% 1.1% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 
Unknown  0.5% 0.9% 0.3% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.6% 0.5% 
         
Occupation         
Manager  7.0% 9.4% 7.4% 9.7% 7.0% 7.1% 7.1% 6.9% 
Professional 8.2% 7.6% 11.5% 12.5% 8.2% 8.2% 8.2% 8.2% 
Associate 
professional 5.2% 5.5% 5.1% 5.4% 5.2% 5.2% 5.1% 5.3% 
Clerical  13.9% 11.0% 9.7% 9.1% 13.9% 13.9% 14.0% 13.5% 
Skilled trades  15.0% 10.7% 14.0% 10.1% 15.0% 14.8% 15.1% 15.1% 
Other services  12.2% 11.0% 10.6% 12.1% 12.2% 12.1% 12.1% 12.2% 
Sales  13.1% 11.5% 16.6% 14.4% 13.1% 13.3% 13.2% 13.1% 
Operatives  9.8% 9.2% 10.0% 10.7% 9.8% 9.6% 9.7% 9.9% 
Elementary  15.7% 24.2% 15.0% 16.2% 15.7% 15.6% 15.6% 15.8% 
         
Earnings of spouse         
Nil  14.0% 12.9% 14.0% 13.2% 14.0% 14.2% 14.0% 14.4% 
Not applicable 67.1% 67.0% 66.0% 64.6% 67.1% 66.9% 66.8% 66.4% 
<€100  0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
€100–€310  1.0% 0.6% 0.8% 0.8% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 
€310–€400  1.6% 1.5% 1.9% 1.5% 1.6% 1.6% 1.7% 1.7% 
€400+  10.3% 10.5% 10.7% 13.6% 10.3% 10.1% 10.3% 10.3% 
Details Unknown 6.0% 7.4% 6.5% 6.2% 6.0% 6.1% 6.1% 6.2% 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
Note:  The weighted descriptive statistics use the propensity score weights, which use the ‘treated in 2011’ group as the 
base case against which the other three groups are matched. As such, the descriptive statistics across the four groups 
are more similar for the weighted measure compared to the unweighted measure. 
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TABLE A4  INDIVIDUALS WITH A LIVE REGISTER HISTORY OF LESS THAN 50 DAYS’ DURATION: DID 
COEFFICIENTS FROM PSM–DID ANALYSIS OF PROBABILITY OF EXITING THE LIVE 
REGISTER  
 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 
All offices     
Placebo (2009–2011) −0.041*** −0.031*** −0.036*** −0.022* 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
 n = 25,850 n = 25,616 n = 25,536 n = 25,477 
Main (2011–2013) 0.048*** 0.044*** 0.038** 0.017 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
 n = 14,978 n = 14,820 n = 14,767 n = 14,734 
Buncrana, Letterkenny, Sligo, Westport     
Placebo (2009–2011) 0.022 −0.008 0.021 0.032 
 (0.024) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) 
 n = 3,825 n = 3,786 n = 3,762 n = 3,748 
Main (2011–2013) 0.018 0.028 −0.006 −0.040 
 (0.033) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) 
 n = 2,092 n = 2,069 n = 2,055 n = 2,054 
Nutgrove, Tallaght     
Placebo (2009–2011) −0.020 −0.022 −0.053** −0.014 
 (0.021) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) 
 n = 5,069 n = 5,039 n = 5,029 n = 5,019 
Main (2011–2013) −0.010 0.007 0.104*** 0.109*** 
 (0.027) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) 
 n = 3,161 n = 3,132 n = 3,125 n = 3,112 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
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TABLE A5 INDIVIDUALS WITH A LIVE REGISTER HISTORY OF LESS THAN 50 DAYS’ DURATION: 
PSM–DID ANALYSIS OF PROBABILITY OF BEING IN EMPLOYMENT  
 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 
All offices     
Placebo (2009–2011) −0.035*** −0.027** −0.036*** −0.018 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
 n = 25,850 n = 25,616 n = 25,536 n = 25,477 
Main (2011–2013) 0.036*** 0.020 0.015 −0.003 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
 n = 14,978 n = 14,820 n = 14,767 n = 14,734 
Buncrana, Letterkenny, Sligo, Westport     
Placebo (2009–2011) 0.039* −0.013 −0.014 0.003 
 (0.021) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) 
 n = 3,825 n = 3,786 n = 3,762 n = 3,748 
Main (2011–2013) −0.003 0.048 0.025 −0.015 
 (0.028) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) 
 n = 2,092 n = 2,069 n = 2,055 n = 2,054 
Nutgrove, Tallaght     
Placebo (2009–2011) −0.020 −0.006 −0.018 −0.013 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) 
 n = 5,069 n = 5,039 n = 5,029 n = 5,019 
Main (2011–2013) −0.017 −0.027 0.038 0.074** 
 (0.025) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032) 
 n = 3,161 n = 3,132 n = 3,125 n = 3,112 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
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TABLE A6 INDIVIDUALS WITH A LIVE REGISTER HISTORY OF LESS THAN 50 DAYS’ DURATION: 
PSM–DID ANALYSIS OF PROBABILITY OF BEING IN EDUCATION, TRAINING OR 
EMPLOYMENT PLACEMENT COURSE  
 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 
All offices     
Placebo (2009–2011) −0.003 −0.003 0.001 −0.003 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
 n = 25,850 n = 25,616 n = 25,536 n = 25,477 
Main (2011–2013) −0.001 0.004 0.000 −0.007 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
 n = 14,978 n = 14,820 n = 14,767 n = 14,734 
Buncrana, Letterkenny, Sligo, Westport     
Placebo (2009–2011) −0.008 0.019 0.022 0.008 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
 n = 3,825 n = 3,786 n = 3,762 n = 3,748 
Main (2011–2013) 0.001 −0.046* −0.023 −0.025 
 (0.015) (0.025) (0.028) (0.026) 
 n = 2,092 n = 2,069 n = 2,055 n = 2,054 
Nutgrove, Tallaght     
Placebo (2009–2011) 0.001 −0.013 −0.009 0.013 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
 n = 5,069 n = 5,039 n = 5,029 n = 5,019 
Main (2011–2013) −0.012 0.006 0.033* 0.007 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017) 
 n = 3,161 n = 3,132 n = 3,125 n = 3,112 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
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TABLE A7 INDIVIDUALS WITH A LIVE REGISTER HISTORY OF LESS THAN 50 DAYS’ DURATION: 
PSM–DID ANALYSIS OF PROBABILITY OF BEING IN ‘OTHER’ OUTCOME CATEGORY  
 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 
All offices     
Placebo (2009–2011) −0.004 −0.002 −0.001 −0.002 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) 
 n = 25,850 n = 25,616 n = 25,536 n = 25,477 
Main (2011–2013) 0.013*** 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.027*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) 
 n = 14,978 n = 14,820 n = 14,767 n = 14,734 
Buncrana, Letterkenny, Sligo, Westport     
Placebo (2009–2011) −0.010 −0.014 0.013 0.021 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) 
 n = 3,825 n = 3,786 n = 3,762 n = 3,748 
Main (2011–2013) 0.019 0.026 −0.009 0.000 
 (0.014) (0.020) (0.023) (0.026) 
 n = 2,092 n = 2,069 n = 2,055 n = 2,054 
Nutgrove, Tallaght     
Placebo (2009–2011) −0.001 −0.002 −0.025* −0.014 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) 
 n = 5,069 n = 5,039 n = 5,029 n = 5,019 
Main (2011–2013) 0.020** 0.028* 0.033* 0.028 
 (0.008) (0.015) (0.019) (0.021) 
 n = 3,161 n = 3,132 n = 3,125 n = 3,112 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
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TABLE A8 DID COEFFICIENTS FROM PSM–DID ANALYSIS OF PROBABILITY OF EXITING THE LIVE 
REGISTER (FULL SAMPLE) 
 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 
All offices     
Placebo (2009–2011) −0.026*** −0.023*** −0.027*** −0.017* 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
 n = 48,330 n = 47,973 n = 47,820 n = 47,706 
Main (2011–2013) 0.024*** 0.033*** 0.030*** 0.015 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
 n = 38,118 n = 37,829 n = 37,673 n = 37,573 
Buncrana, Letterkenny, Sligo, Westport     
Placebo (2009–2011) −0.005 −0.003 −0.017 0.013 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
 n = 7,769 n = 7,697 n = 7,657 n = 7,628 
Main (2011–2013) 0.028 0.054** 0.068*** 0.025 
 (0.021) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
 n = 5,859 n = 5,798 n = 5,765 n = 5,747 
Nutgrove, Tallaght     
Placebo (2009–2011) −0.005 −0.017 −0.013 −0.002 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
 n = 9,191 n = 9,153 n = 9,134 n = 9,117 
Main (2011–2013) −0.001 0.034 0.061*** 0.047** 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
 n = 7,568 n = 7,526 n = 7,500 n = 7,473 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
TABLE A9 PSM–DID ANALYSIS OF PROBABILITY OF BEING IN EMPLOYMENT (FULL SAMPLE) 
 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 
All offices     
Placebo (2009–2011) −0.025*** −0.019** −0.023*** −0.008 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 n = 48,330 n = 47,973 n = 47,820 n = 47,706 
Main (2011–2013) 0.019** 0.015 0.004 −0.007 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
 n = 38,118 n = 37,829 n = 37,673 n = 37,573 
Buncrana, Letterkenny, Sligo, Westport     
Placebo (2009–2011) −0.013 −0.011 −0.028 −0.008 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
 n = 7,769 n = 7,697 n = 7,657 n = 7,628 
Main (2011–2013) 0.026 0.048** 0.056** 0.027 
 (0.019) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
 n = 5,859 n = 5,798 n = 5,765 n = 5,747 
Nutgrove, Tallaght     
Placebo (2009–2011) −0.007 −0.008 −0.000 −0.006 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
 n = 9,191 9,153 n = 9,134 n = 9,117 
Main (2011–2013) −0.020 0.008 0.010 0.021 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
 n = 7,568 n = 7,526 n = 7,500 n = 7,473 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
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TABLE A10 PSM–DID ANALYSIS OF PROBABILITY OF BEING IN EDUCATION, TRAINING OR 
EMPLOYMENT PLACEMENT COURSE (FULL SAMPLE) 
 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 
All offices     
Placebo (2009–2011) 0.002 0.002 0.001 −0.003 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 0.004 
 n = 48,330 n = 47,973 n = 47,820 n = 47,706 
Main (2011–2013) −0.003 0.003 0.006 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
 n = 38,118 n = 37,829 n = 37,673 n = 37,573 
Buncrana, Letterkenny, Sligo, Westport     
Placebo (2009–2011) 0.014** 0.016 0.007 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
 n = 7,769 n = 7,697 n = 7,657 n = 7,628 
Main (2011–2013) −0.007 −0.010 0.006 0.003 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) 
 n = 5,859 n = 5,798 n = 5,765 n = 5,747 
Nutgrove, Tallaght     
Placebo (2009–2011) 0.005 −0.016** −0.007 0.009 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
 n = 9,191 n = 9,153 n = 9,134 n = 9,117 
Main (2011–2013) −0.006 −0.006 0.006 0.005 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
 n = 7,568 n = 7,526 n = 7,500 n = 7,473 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
 
TABLE A11 PSM–DID ANALYSIS OF PROBABILITY OF BEING IN ‘OTHER’ OUTCOME CATEGORY 
(FULL SAMPLE)  
 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 
All offices     
Placebo (2009–2011) −0.003 −0.006* −0.006 −0.006 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
 n = 48,330 n = 47,973 n = 47,820 n = 47,706 
Main (2011–2013) 0.008** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
 n = 38,118 n = 37,829 n = 37,673 n = 37,573 
Buncrana, Letterkenny, Sligo, Westport     
Placebo (2009–2011) −0.006 −0.008 0.004 0.018 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) 
 n = 7,769 n = 6,697 n = 7,657 n = 7,628 
Main (2011–2013) 0.009 0.016 0.006 −0.006 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) 
 n = 5,859 n = 5,798 n = 5,765 n = 5,747 
Nutgrove, Tallaght     
Placebo (2009–2011) −0.003 0.007 −0.006 −0.005 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) 
 n = 9,191 n = 9,153 n = 9,134 n = 9,117 
Main (2011–2013) 0.012** 0.016* 0.019* 0.019 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) 
 n = 7,568 n = 7,526 n = 7,500 n = 7,473 
 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
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